ubiquitous-invention/apps/web/server/routers/invites.ts
Randall Stillwell 7a55d6d1c6 feat(invites): workspace_invites schema + tRPC router + role management (Task 2, part 1/2)
Schema half of Task-workspace-invites-and-roles. Lands the table, the
invites router (create/list/revoke/accept), and the two new workspaces
procedures (updateMemberRole/removeMember). UI ships in part 2/2.

This is a stable checkpoint for Task 3 (invite-recipient-autocomplete)
to start building against — the procedure surface area is frozen and the
new identity helper from Task 1 is in the accept path.

Schema:
* workspace_invites: id, workspace_id, email (lowercased), role
  (owner/admin/member), invited_by_user_id, token (base64url 32B),
  expires_at (DEFAULT now() + 14d), accepted_at, revoked_at, created_at.
* Indexes: workspace_id, UNIQUE(token), and a PARTIAL UNIQUE on
  (workspace_id, email) WHERE accepted_at IS NULL AND revoked_at IS NULL.
  An open invite is unique per (workspace, email); closed invites
  (accepted or revoked) fall out of the constraint so re-invites work.
* Drizzle relations wired: workspaceInvites.workspace,
  workspaceInvites.invitedBy, workspaces.invites.
* Migration 0006_broad_lethal_legion applied to dev DB.

invites router:
* create({email, role}) on workspaceProcedure (owner/admin only).
  Generates a base64url token from 32 random bytes via node:crypto.
  Idempotent on (workspace, email) — if an open invite already exists,
  returns it instead of inserting (the partial unique would block it
  anyway). Refuses self-invite. Refuses if the email is already a
  member.
* list() returns pending (non-accepted, non-revoked) invites with
  inviter name/email joined for UI display.
* revoke({inviteId}) authorizes against the invite's workspace, not
  the caller's input (the inviteId carries its own tenant scope).
* accept({token}) is protectedProcedure (no workspace handle). Calls
  userOwnsEmail() from Task 1 — if the caller doesn't own the invited
  email under any of their verified identities, throws FORBIDDEN with
  a structured cause ({reason: "email_not_owned", invitedEmail}) so
  the redeem page can render the "link this email" explainer. Handles
  expiry, revoked, already-accepted states with clear messages.
  Idempotent on existing membership — if you've already been added by
  another flow, accept just closes the invite without re-inserting.

workspaces additions:
* updateMemberRole: admin/owner only. Three guards:
    1. Can't change your own role (avoids accidental lockout).
    2. Can't demote the only owner-role member (would leave the
       membership-level ownership empty even though workspaces.owner_user_id
       still points there — see ADR-pragmatic decision documented in the
       Task-multi-email-identity convoy discussion).
    3. Only owners can promote to owner; admins move people between
       admin/member but cannot create a new owner.
* removeMember: admin/owner OR self (the leave-workspace affordance).
  Same last-owner guard. Admins can't remove owners (only owners can,
  via demote-then-remove).

Wired both new routers into root.ts as `invites` and `identity`
(identity was landed in Task 1; this commit just keeps the registration
visible alongside invites).

All three CI gates green: 0 lint errors, 14 unchanged warnings, 6/6
type-check, 14/14 tests (no new tests yet — apps/web vitest harness is
filed as Task-bootstrap-vitest-for-apps-web P2).

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-06-02 10:27:44 -05:00

345 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript

import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import { and, desc, eq, isNull } from "drizzle-orm";
import { z } from "zod";
import { router, protectedProcedure, workspaceProcedure } from "@/server/trpc";
import { userOwnsEmail } from "@/server/lib/identity";
import {
workspaceInvites,
workspaceMembers,
workspaces,
users,
} from "@tasks/database/schema";
/**
* Workspace invites. Owners and admins create invites for an email address;
* the recipient redeems the opaque `token` at /invite/[token].
*
* Security model:
* - `create`, `list`, `revoke` are workspace-scoped and require the caller
* to be `owner` or `admin` on the target workspace.
* - `accept` is a *public* procedure (no workspace handle) — the token
* itself is the capability. It does require an authenticated session
* so we can write the `workspace_members.user_id` row, and it calls
* `userOwnsEmail()` from Task 1 to make sure the human accepting the
* invite actually controls the invited address under any of their
* linked identities. Mismatch returns a structured error so the UI can
* show the explainer instead of silently 403-ing.
*
* Email delivery is not in this task — `create` returns the accept URL so
* an operator can copy/paste it. The Resend/Postmark integration is a
* follow-up.
*/
const ROLE_VALUES = ["owner", "admin", "member"] as const;
const inviteRoleSchema = z.enum(ROLE_VALUES);
const inviteEmailSchema = z
.string()
.trim()
.toLowerCase()
.pipe(z.string().email({ message: "Please enter a valid email address" }));
function assertCanManageInvites(role: string): void {
if (role !== "owner" && role !== "admin") {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "FORBIDDEN",
message: "Only owners and admins can manage invites",
});
}
}
function generateInviteToken(): string {
// 32 random bytes -> 43-char base64url. Enough entropy that a token guess
// is astronomically improbable; short enough to fit in a copy-paste URL.
return randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
}
function buildAcceptUrl(token: string): string {
// `NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL` is the canonical origin for invite links. Falls
// back to a path-only URL so the procedure still works in environments
// without it set (the UI can prefix `window.location.origin` if needed).
const base = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL?.replace(/\/$/, "");
return base ? `${base}/invite/${token}` : `/invite/${token}`;
}
export const invitesRouter = router({
/**
* Create or return-existing an open invite for `email` to the given
* workspace. Idempotent on the (workspace_id, lower(email)) pair: if an
* open invite already exists for that address, we return it instead of
* inserting a duplicate (the partial unique constraint would block it
* anyway).
*/
create: workspaceProcedure
.input(
z.object({
email: inviteEmailSchema,
role: inviteRoleSchema,
}),
)
.mutation(async ({ ctx, input }) => {
assertCanManageInvites(ctx.workspace.role);
const inviterId = ctx.session.user.id;
// Don't let inviters invite themselves — confusing failure mode.
const [inviter] = await ctx.db
.select({ email: users.email })
.from(users)
.where(eq(users.id, inviterId))
.limit(1);
if (inviter?.email.toLowerCase() === input.email) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "BAD_REQUEST",
message: "You can't invite yourself.",
});
}
// Already a member? Surface a clear error so the inviter knows.
const [existingMember] = await ctx.db
.select({ userId: workspaceMembers.userId })
.from(workspaceMembers)
.innerJoin(users, eq(users.id, workspaceMembers.userId))
.where(
and(
eq(workspaceMembers.workspaceId, ctx.workspace.id),
eq(users.email, input.email),
),
)
.limit(1);
if (existingMember) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "CONFLICT",
message: "This person is already a member of this workspace.",
});
}
// Reuse an open invite if one already exists for this (workspace, email).
const [existingInvite] = await ctx.db
.select()
.from(workspaceInvites)
.where(
and(
eq(workspaceInvites.workspaceId, ctx.workspace.id),
eq(workspaceInvites.email, input.email),
isNull(workspaceInvites.acceptedAt),
isNull(workspaceInvites.revokedAt),
),
)
.limit(1);
if (existingInvite) {
return {
invite: existingInvite,
acceptUrl: buildAcceptUrl(existingInvite.token),
reused: true as const,
};
}
const token = generateInviteToken();
const [invite] = await ctx.db
.insert(workspaceInvites)
.values({
workspaceId: ctx.workspace.id,
email: input.email,
role: input.role,
invitedByUserId: inviterId,
token,
})
.returning();
return {
invite: invite!,
acceptUrl: buildAcceptUrl(invite!.token),
reused: false as const,
};
}),
/** Pending (non-accepted, non-revoked) invites for the workspace. */
list: workspaceProcedure.query(async ({ ctx }) => {
assertCanManageInvites(ctx.workspace.role);
return ctx.db
.select({
id: workspaceInvites.id,
email: workspaceInvites.email,
role: workspaceInvites.role,
token: workspaceInvites.token,
expiresAt: workspaceInvites.expiresAt,
createdAt: workspaceInvites.createdAt,
invitedByUserId: workspaceInvites.invitedByUserId,
invitedByName: users.name,
invitedByEmail: users.email,
})
.from(workspaceInvites)
.innerJoin(users, eq(users.id, workspaceInvites.invitedByUserId))
.where(
and(
eq(workspaceInvites.workspaceId, ctx.workspace.id),
isNull(workspaceInvites.acceptedAt),
isNull(workspaceInvites.revokedAt),
),
)
.orderBy(desc(workspaceInvites.createdAt));
}),
/** Revoke an open invite. Caller must be owner/admin on the invite's workspace. */
revoke: protectedProcedure
.input(z.object({ inviteId: z.string().uuid() }))
.mutation(async ({ ctx, input }) => {
const [invite] = await ctx.db
.select({
id: workspaceInvites.id,
workspaceId: workspaceInvites.workspaceId,
acceptedAt: workspaceInvites.acceptedAt,
revokedAt: workspaceInvites.revokedAt,
})
.from(workspaceInvites)
.where(eq(workspaceInvites.id, input.inviteId))
.limit(1);
if (!invite) {
throw new TRPCError({ code: "NOT_FOUND", message: "Invite not found" });
}
if (invite.acceptedAt || invite.revokedAt) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "BAD_REQUEST",
message: "This invite has already been closed.",
});
}
// Authorize against the invite's workspace, not via workspaceProcedure
// (we don't take a workspace handle in this input; the invite tells us).
const callerId = ctx.session.user.id;
const [membership] = await ctx.db
.select({ role: workspaceMembers.role })
.from(workspaceMembers)
.where(
and(
eq(workspaceMembers.workspaceId, invite.workspaceId),
eq(workspaceMembers.userId, callerId),
),
)
.limit(1);
if (!membership) {
throw new TRPCError({ code: "FORBIDDEN" });
}
assertCanManageInvites(membership.role);
await ctx.db
.update(workspaceInvites)
.set({ revokedAt: new Date() })
.where(eq(workspaceInvites.id, invite.id));
return { ok: true as const };
}),
/**
* Public-by-token redemption. Caller must be authenticated AND own (under
* any linked identity) the email the invite was sent to. On mismatch we
* throw a `FORBIDDEN` with a structured `cause` the UI can render as the
* "link this email first" explainer.
*/
accept: protectedProcedure
.input(z.object({ token: z.string().min(8).max(128) }))
.mutation(async ({ ctx, input }) => {
const now = new Date();
const [invite] = await ctx.db
.select({
id: workspaceInvites.id,
workspaceId: workspaceInvites.workspaceId,
email: workspaceInvites.email,
role: workspaceInvites.role,
acceptedAt: workspaceInvites.acceptedAt,
revokedAt: workspaceInvites.revokedAt,
expiresAt: workspaceInvites.expiresAt,
})
.from(workspaceInvites)
.where(eq(workspaceInvites.token, input.token))
.limit(1);
if (!invite) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "NOT_FOUND",
message: "This invite link is not valid.",
});
}
if (invite.revokedAt) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "BAD_REQUEST",
message: "This invite has been revoked.",
});
}
if (invite.acceptedAt) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "BAD_REQUEST",
message: "This invite has already been accepted.",
});
}
if (invite.expiresAt.getTime() < now.getTime()) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "BAD_REQUEST",
message: "This invite has expired.",
});
}
const callerId = ctx.session.user.id;
// Identity check: under Task 1's semantics, the caller must have a
// verified identity row matching the invited email. We surface the
// mismatch with a structured cause so the redeem page can render the
// "link this email to your account first" explainer.
const owns = await userOwnsEmail(callerId, invite.email);
if (!owns) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "FORBIDDEN",
message: `This invite was sent to ${invite.email}. Link that email to your account from your profile, then come back to this link.`,
cause: { reason: "email_not_owned", invitedEmail: invite.email },
});
}
// Already a member? Don't fail — just close the invite. Common when
// someone accepts a re-invite after already being added by another flow.
const [existingMembership] = await ctx.db
.select({ id: workspaceMembers.id })
.from(workspaceMembers)
.where(
and(
eq(workspaceMembers.workspaceId, invite.workspaceId),
eq(workspaceMembers.userId, callerId),
),
)
.limit(1);
if (!existingMembership) {
await ctx.db.insert(workspaceMembers).values({
workspaceId: invite.workspaceId,
userId: callerId,
role: invite.role,
});
}
await ctx.db
.update(workspaceInvites)
.set({ acceptedAt: now })
.where(eq(workspaceInvites.id, invite.id));
const [workspace] = await ctx.db
.select({ id: workspaces.id, slug: workspaces.slug, name: workspaces.name })
.from(workspaces)
.where(eq(workspaces.id, invite.workspaceId))
.limit(1);
return {
workspace: workspace!,
role: invite.role,
};
}),
});
export type InvitesRouter = typeof invitesRouter;
// Re-exports used by callers that want to share the schema (e.g. the smart
// recipient autocomplete in Task 3).
export const inviteRoleValues = ROLE_VALUES;
export { inviteRoleSchema };