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7a55d6d1c6
Schema half of Task-workspace-invites-and-roles. Lands the table, the
invites router (create/list/revoke/accept), and the two new workspaces
procedures (updateMemberRole/removeMember). UI ships in part 2/2.
This is a stable checkpoint for Task 3 (invite-recipient-autocomplete)
to start building against — the procedure surface area is frozen and the
new identity helper from Task 1 is in the accept path.
Schema:
* workspace_invites: id, workspace_id, email (lowercased), role
(owner/admin/member), invited_by_user_id, token (base64url 32B),
expires_at (DEFAULT now() + 14d), accepted_at, revoked_at, created_at.
* Indexes: workspace_id, UNIQUE(token), and a PARTIAL UNIQUE on
(workspace_id, email) WHERE accepted_at IS NULL AND revoked_at IS NULL.
An open invite is unique per (workspace, email); closed invites
(accepted or revoked) fall out of the constraint so re-invites work.
* Drizzle relations wired: workspaceInvites.workspace,
workspaceInvites.invitedBy, workspaces.invites.
* Migration 0006_broad_lethal_legion applied to dev DB.
invites router:
* create({email, role}) on workspaceProcedure (owner/admin only).
Generates a base64url token from 32 random bytes via node:crypto.
Idempotent on (workspace, email) — if an open invite already exists,
returns it instead of inserting (the partial unique would block it
anyway). Refuses self-invite. Refuses if the email is already a
member.
* list() returns pending (non-accepted, non-revoked) invites with
inviter name/email joined for UI display.
* revoke({inviteId}) authorizes against the invite's workspace, not
the caller's input (the inviteId carries its own tenant scope).
* accept({token}) is protectedProcedure (no workspace handle). Calls
userOwnsEmail() from Task 1 — if the caller doesn't own the invited
email under any of their verified identities, throws FORBIDDEN with
a structured cause ({reason: "email_not_owned", invitedEmail}) so
the redeem page can render the "link this email" explainer. Handles
expiry, revoked, already-accepted states with clear messages.
Idempotent on existing membership — if you've already been added by
another flow, accept just closes the invite without re-inserting.
workspaces additions:
* updateMemberRole: admin/owner only. Three guards:
1. Can't change your own role (avoids accidental lockout).
2. Can't demote the only owner-role member (would leave the
membership-level ownership empty even though workspaces.owner_user_id
still points there — see ADR-pragmatic decision documented in the
Task-multi-email-identity convoy discussion).
3. Only owners can promote to owner; admins move people between
admin/member but cannot create a new owner.
* removeMember: admin/owner OR self (the leave-workspace affordance).
Same last-owner guard. Admins can't remove owners (only owners can,
via demote-then-remove).
Wired both new routers into root.ts as `invites` and `identity`
(identity was landed in Task 1; this commit just keeps the registration
visible alongside invites).
All three CI gates green: 0 lint errors, 14 unchanged warnings, 6/6
type-check, 14/14 tests (no new tests yet — apps/web vitest harness is
filed as Task-bootstrap-vitest-for-apps-web P2).
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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| config | ||
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| packages | ||
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| .env.example | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| AGENTS.md | ||
| package.json | ||
| pnpm-lock.yaml | ||
| pnpm-workspace.yaml | ||
| tsconfig.json | ||
| turbo.json | ||