Soft-delete cascade was the missing half of archive: stamping
workspaces.archived_at alone left objects visible to anyone with a
direct id. The cascade runs in one transaction so the partial state
isn't reachable, and restore inverts it for any archived row in the
workspace — provenance-blind on purpose until we have a use case
that needs to distinguish per-workspace from per-object archives.
audit_log keeps the keyset index on (workspace_id, created_at) and
the actor_user_id FK with onDelete set null. recordAudit() refuses
to write a null actor without a metadata.system_actor label so the
audit view always has something to render. workspaces and invites
mutations call recordAudit on success; objects-router instrumentation
and the markdown importer's system-actor flow are filed as P2
follow-ups because each needs a thoughtful "what's audit-worthy?"
pass, not mechanical wiring.
Settings → Audit log lives at /<slug>/settings/audit, owner-gated,
keyset-paginated. ACTION_LABELS is small on purpose; new actions
fall back to their raw key so missing a label degrades gracefully.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Algorithm: a fixed-window token bucket implemented as a pure function in
`@tasks/shared` (`consumeTokenBucket`) plus a thin `apps/web` wrapper that
holds per-key state in a module-scoped `Map`. No Redis, no external deps —
horizontally-scaled deploys will need a Redis-backed swap behind the same
`rateLimit()` signature; called out in the JSDoc as a follow-up. The pure
core is unit-tested in `packages/shared` (6 new vitest cases covering
allow/deny, window reset, key isolation, monotonic retryAfterMs, denied-
flood pegging, and option validation); the wrapper is intentionally not
tested here because apps/web has no vitest harness yet.
Wire-ins (the two narrow surfaces called out in the v1 spec):
1. Credentials `authorize` in `apps/web/lib/auth.ts`: 5 attempts per
IP per 60s. IP comes from `next/headers` (x-forwarded-for first
entry, then x-real-ip); when headers() throws or returns nothing we
fall back to keying on "unknown" in prod and skipping the limiter
entirely in dev so a local test loop doesn't lock itself out. On a
trip we `console.warn` and return null — the standard Auth.js
"auth failed" signal — without consulting the DB.
2. `invites.create` in `apps/web/server/routers/invites.ts`: 10
invite-creates per inviter per hour. Keyed by inviter id (not
workspace) so a multi-workspace admin can't multiply their
allowance. On trip we throw TRPCError TOO_MANY_REQUESTS with a
retry-after seconds count baked into the message.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
First half of Task-multi-email-identity. Lays down everything except the
NextAuth callback wiring, which is gated on a research subagent finishing
its survey of OAuth provider behavior for the email_verified claim
across GitHub, Google, and Authentik.
Schema (packages/database):
* New user_email_identities table colocated with `users` in users.ts.
Columns: id, user_id (FK), email (lowercased), verified_at, source,
created_at, last_used_at.
* Indexes: user_id, email, unique(user_id, email), and a PARTIAL unique
index on email WHERE verified_at IS NOT NULL — a verified email
resolves to exactly one users row globally, while unverified rows
(none today; placeholder for the manual-verification follow-up) do
not share the constraint.
* Drizzle relation: users.emailIdentities -> userEmailIdentities, and
the inverse one(users) relation.
* Migration 0005 generated by db:generate, augmented with a backfill
INSERT that seeds one source='primary' identity per existing users
row using created_at as verified_at. Migration applied to dev DB;
existing admin@tasks.dev user verified as 1:1 mapped.
Server (apps/web/server):
* apps/web/server/lib/identity.ts exports two pure read helpers:
- userOwnsEmail(userId, email): boolean used by the (upcoming)
invite-accept procedure to verify the human controls the invited
address under any of their linked identities.
- findUserIdByVerifiedEmail(email): the replacement for the old
ensureUserIdByEmail lookup. Will be called from auth.ts once the
OAuth research subagent returns.
* apps/web/server/routers/identity.ts exposes identity.listMine — a
protected procedure returning the caller's identities ordered by
verifiedAt desc. Cross-user identity surface is intentionally NOT
exposed here; that lives behind the workspace-scoped autocomplete
in Task 3 with its own tenancy fence.
UI (apps/web/app):
* New route /[workspaceSlug]/settings/profile renders a read-only
"Linked emails" section with per-identity row (email, source badge,
verified state, last-used relative time) plus a hint that explains
how to add another email (sign in via that email's OAuth provider).
* Empty / loading / error states all handled. The "no identities"
branch should never fire post-backfill but renders a friendly
message instead of throwing.
What's NOT in this commit:
* auth.ts changes (ensureUserIdByEmail -> ensureUserIdByVerifiedEmail,
OAuth callback identity upsert, cross-user conflict rejection).
Waiting on subagent research to land the callback wiring correctly
on the first try across all three providers.
* Vitest tests. The pure helpers are 10-line query shims and the
behavior-relevant assertion is the auth callback path — easier to
write meaningful tests once that lands.
All three CI gates green: pnpm lint (14 pre-existing warnings,
unchanged), pnpm type-check (6/6 packages), pnpm test (14/14
existing tests across @tasks/shared, @tasks/database, @tasks/ai).
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Path-A first task: get the repo's two repo-wide quality gates passing.
Both were failing from a clean clone in ways that were silently hiding
each other.
Headline fixes:
* apps/web: add an eslint 9 flat config (eslint.config.mjs) using
FlatCompat against next/core-web-vitals + next/typescript, and switch
the `lint` script from `next lint` to `eslint .`. Previously `next
lint` fell into its interactive setup prompt because there was no
config at all in apps/web, which made `pnpm lint` permanently fail
before any rule ever ran.
* packages/shared/src/utils/id.ts: replace `randomUUID` from `node:crypto`
with `globalThis.crypto.randomUUID`. `@tasks/shared` is forbidden from
using Node-only APIs (per AGENTS.md / repo-overview.mdc) because it
has to be importable from the browser bundle.
Adjacent fixes pulled in to make the gates actually green:
* apps/mcp-server/tsconfig.json: drop vestigial rootDir / declaration*
/ outDir / sourceMap (build is via tsup, not tsc emit) and add
allowImportingTsExtensions. The MCP server uses `.ts`-extension
re-export shims (db.ts / schema.ts / shared-types.ts) so tsup can
inline workspace .ts sources into the bundle.
* apps/collab-server/tsconfig.json: same simplification.
* apps/mcp-server/package.json: add @types/node so `process.env` in
packages/database/src/client.ts (transitively pulled into the MCP
server's type-check) resolves.
* apps/web/components/ui/input.tsx: empty `interface InputProps extends
React.InputHTMLAttributes<HTMLInputElement> {}` -> `type` alias.
* apps/web/server/lib/workspace-guard.ts: `from(args.table as any)` ->
`as unknown as PgTable` with a comment. Standard drizzle escape
hatch for structural generic tables.
* apps/web/components/whiteboard/shapes/{document,project,task}-card.tsx:
`BaseBoxShapeUtil<any>` -> `BaseBoxShapeUtil<{Shape}>` plus inline
`declare module "@tldraw/tlschema"` augmentation of
TLGlobalShapePropsMap. Required adding @tldraw/tlschema as a direct
devDep of apps/web so the augmentation target resolves; previously
it was only present transitively under tldraw's own deps.
Result: `pnpm lint && pnpm type-check` exits 0 across all 6 packages.
16 unused-import / exhaustive-deps warnings remain; they're pre-existing
housekeeping and out of scope for this task.
Closes plans/Plan-daily-driver-finish/Epic-shipping-the-shell/
Task-fix-lint-and-shared-types.md (status: done).
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Block A of the EchoDo plan. Workspaces used to live as `objects(type='workspace')`,
which made it impossible to put a real RLS-friendly tenant boundary on the schema
or to give each workspace a stable URL slug. This commit:
- Adds a top-level `workspaces` table (slug unique, owner FK, plan_tier hook).
- Migrates the 8 anchor tables (objects, workspace_members, object_type_defs,
property_definitions, templates, forms, markdown_backlog_items,
cursor_sync_mappings) to FK into `workspaces.id` instead of `objects.id`,
with a hand-augmented data-copy migration that preserves IDs and slug-collision-
proofs on backfill.
- Introduces a `workspaceProcedure` tRPC middleware + `resolveWorkspace` helper
that take a UUID-or-slug `workspace` handle and expose `ctx.workspace`. All
tenant-scoped routers (objects, types, properties, templates, forms, search,
ai, relations, favorites) now flow through it.
- Updates the web app to pass `workspace` slugs from the URL (or store) instead
of the old `workspaceId`, including a workspace-sync layer that rewrites
/<UUID>/... links to /<slug>/...
- Updates the MCP tools (list_objects, create_object, search_objects) and the
workspace://{handle}/tree resource to accept either a slug or UUID so existing
agents keep working.
- Adds a Create Workspace dialog and a Workspace Settings page (rename + slug
rename with redirect, owner-only archive).
Verified locally against a fresh Postgres: migration applies cleanly, slug
uniqueness holds, tenant data is isolated by workspace_id, slug↔UUID resolution
works in both directions, and ON DELETE CASCADE cleans up child rows in the
correct workspace only.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>