ubiquitous-invention/apps/web/server/root.ts

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import { router, createCallerFactory } from "@/server/trpc";
import { healthRouter } from "@/server/routers/health";
import { objectsRouter } from "@/server/routers/objects";
import { propertiesRouter } from "@/server/routers/properties";
import { relationsRouter } from "@/server/routers/relations";
import { aiRouter } from "@/server/routers/ai";
import { templatesRouter } from "@/server/routers/templates";
import { searchRouter } from "@/server/routers/search";
import { workspacesRouter } from "@/server/routers/workspaces";
import { typesRouter } from "@/server/routers/types";
import { formsRouter } from "@/server/routers/forms";
import { favoritesRouter } from "@/server/routers/favorites";
feat(identity): schema + helpers + read-only profile UI (Task 1, part 1/2) First half of Task-multi-email-identity. Lays down everything except the NextAuth callback wiring, which is gated on a research subagent finishing its survey of OAuth provider behavior for the email_verified claim across GitHub, Google, and Authentik. Schema (packages/database): * New user_email_identities table colocated with `users` in users.ts. Columns: id, user_id (FK), email (lowercased), verified_at, source, created_at, last_used_at. * Indexes: user_id, email, unique(user_id, email), and a PARTIAL unique index on email WHERE verified_at IS NOT NULL — a verified email resolves to exactly one users row globally, while unverified rows (none today; placeholder for the manual-verification follow-up) do not share the constraint. * Drizzle relation: users.emailIdentities -> userEmailIdentities, and the inverse one(users) relation. * Migration 0005 generated by db:generate, augmented with a backfill INSERT that seeds one source='primary' identity per existing users row using created_at as verified_at. Migration applied to dev DB; existing admin@tasks.dev user verified as 1:1 mapped. Server (apps/web/server): * apps/web/server/lib/identity.ts exports two pure read helpers: - userOwnsEmail(userId, email): boolean used by the (upcoming) invite-accept procedure to verify the human controls the invited address under any of their linked identities. - findUserIdByVerifiedEmail(email): the replacement for the old ensureUserIdByEmail lookup. Will be called from auth.ts once the OAuth research subagent returns. * apps/web/server/routers/identity.ts exposes identity.listMine — a protected procedure returning the caller's identities ordered by verifiedAt desc. Cross-user identity surface is intentionally NOT exposed here; that lives behind the workspace-scoped autocomplete in Task 3 with its own tenancy fence. UI (apps/web/app): * New route /[workspaceSlug]/settings/profile renders a read-only "Linked emails" section with per-identity row (email, source badge, verified state, last-used relative time) plus a hint that explains how to add another email (sign in via that email's OAuth provider). * Empty / loading / error states all handled. The "no identities" branch should never fire post-backfill but renders a friendly message instead of throwing. What's NOT in this commit: * auth.ts changes (ensureUserIdByEmail -> ensureUserIdByVerifiedEmail, OAuth callback identity upsert, cross-user conflict rejection). Waiting on subagent research to land the callback wiring correctly on the first try across all three providers. * Vitest tests. The pure helpers are 10-line query shims and the behavior-relevant assertion is the auth callback path — easier to write meaningful tests once that lands. All three CI gates green: pnpm lint (14 pre-existing warnings, unchanged), pnpm type-check (6/6 packages), pnpm test (14/14 existing tests across @tasks/shared, @tasks/database, @tasks/ai). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-06-02 11:07:50 -04:00
import { identityRouter } from "@/server/routers/identity";
feat(invites): workspace_invites schema + tRPC router + role management (Task 2, part 1/2) Schema half of Task-workspace-invites-and-roles. Lands the table, the invites router (create/list/revoke/accept), and the two new workspaces procedures (updateMemberRole/removeMember). UI ships in part 2/2. This is a stable checkpoint for Task 3 (invite-recipient-autocomplete) to start building against — the procedure surface area is frozen and the new identity helper from Task 1 is in the accept path. Schema: * workspace_invites: id, workspace_id, email (lowercased), role (owner/admin/member), invited_by_user_id, token (base64url 32B), expires_at (DEFAULT now() + 14d), accepted_at, revoked_at, created_at. * Indexes: workspace_id, UNIQUE(token), and a PARTIAL UNIQUE on (workspace_id, email) WHERE accepted_at IS NULL AND revoked_at IS NULL. An open invite is unique per (workspace, email); closed invites (accepted or revoked) fall out of the constraint so re-invites work. * Drizzle relations wired: workspaceInvites.workspace, workspaceInvites.invitedBy, workspaces.invites. * Migration 0006_broad_lethal_legion applied to dev DB. invites router: * create({email, role}) on workspaceProcedure (owner/admin only). Generates a base64url token from 32 random bytes via node:crypto. Idempotent on (workspace, email) — if an open invite already exists, returns it instead of inserting (the partial unique would block it anyway). Refuses self-invite. Refuses if the email is already a member. * list() returns pending (non-accepted, non-revoked) invites with inviter name/email joined for UI display. * revoke({inviteId}) authorizes against the invite's workspace, not the caller's input (the inviteId carries its own tenant scope). * accept({token}) is protectedProcedure (no workspace handle). Calls userOwnsEmail() from Task 1 — if the caller doesn't own the invited email under any of their verified identities, throws FORBIDDEN with a structured cause ({reason: "email_not_owned", invitedEmail}) so the redeem page can render the "link this email" explainer. Handles expiry, revoked, already-accepted states with clear messages. Idempotent on existing membership — if you've already been added by another flow, accept just closes the invite without re-inserting. workspaces additions: * updateMemberRole: admin/owner only. Three guards: 1. Can't change your own role (avoids accidental lockout). 2. Can't demote the only owner-role member (would leave the membership-level ownership empty even though workspaces.owner_user_id still points there — see ADR-pragmatic decision documented in the Task-multi-email-identity convoy discussion). 3. Only owners can promote to owner; admins move people between admin/member but cannot create a new owner. * removeMember: admin/owner OR self (the leave-workspace affordance). Same last-owner guard. Admins can't remove owners (only owners can, via demote-then-remove). Wired both new routers into root.ts as `invites` and `identity` (identity was landed in Task 1; this commit just keeps the registration visible alongside invites). All three CI gates green: 0 lint errors, 14 unchanged warnings, 6/6 type-check, 14/14 tests (no new tests yet — apps/web vitest harness is filed as Task-bootstrap-vitest-for-apps-web P2). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-06-02 11:27:44 -04:00
import { invitesRouter } from "@/server/routers/invites";
import { auditRouter } from "@/server/routers/audit";
import { runsRouter } from "@/server/routers/runs";
import { backlogRouter } from "@/server/routers/backlog";
export const appRouter = router({
health: healthRouter,
workspaces: workspacesRouter,
types: typesRouter,
objects: objectsRouter,
properties: propertiesRouter,
relations: relationsRouter,
ai: aiRouter,
templates: templatesRouter,
search: searchRouter,
forms: formsRouter,
favorites: favoritesRouter,
feat(identity): schema + helpers + read-only profile UI (Task 1, part 1/2) First half of Task-multi-email-identity. Lays down everything except the NextAuth callback wiring, which is gated on a research subagent finishing its survey of OAuth provider behavior for the email_verified claim across GitHub, Google, and Authentik. Schema (packages/database): * New user_email_identities table colocated with `users` in users.ts. Columns: id, user_id (FK), email (lowercased), verified_at, source, created_at, last_used_at. * Indexes: user_id, email, unique(user_id, email), and a PARTIAL unique index on email WHERE verified_at IS NOT NULL — a verified email resolves to exactly one users row globally, while unverified rows (none today; placeholder for the manual-verification follow-up) do not share the constraint. * Drizzle relation: users.emailIdentities -> userEmailIdentities, and the inverse one(users) relation. * Migration 0005 generated by db:generate, augmented with a backfill INSERT that seeds one source='primary' identity per existing users row using created_at as verified_at. Migration applied to dev DB; existing admin@tasks.dev user verified as 1:1 mapped. Server (apps/web/server): * apps/web/server/lib/identity.ts exports two pure read helpers: - userOwnsEmail(userId, email): boolean used by the (upcoming) invite-accept procedure to verify the human controls the invited address under any of their linked identities. - findUserIdByVerifiedEmail(email): the replacement for the old ensureUserIdByEmail lookup. Will be called from auth.ts once the OAuth research subagent returns. * apps/web/server/routers/identity.ts exposes identity.listMine — a protected procedure returning the caller's identities ordered by verifiedAt desc. Cross-user identity surface is intentionally NOT exposed here; that lives behind the workspace-scoped autocomplete in Task 3 with its own tenancy fence. UI (apps/web/app): * New route /[workspaceSlug]/settings/profile renders a read-only "Linked emails" section with per-identity row (email, source badge, verified state, last-used relative time) plus a hint that explains how to add another email (sign in via that email's OAuth provider). * Empty / loading / error states all handled. The "no identities" branch should never fire post-backfill but renders a friendly message instead of throwing. What's NOT in this commit: * auth.ts changes (ensureUserIdByEmail -> ensureUserIdByVerifiedEmail, OAuth callback identity upsert, cross-user conflict rejection). Waiting on subagent research to land the callback wiring correctly on the first try across all three providers. * Vitest tests. The pure helpers are 10-line query shims and the behavior-relevant assertion is the auth callback path — easier to write meaningful tests once that lands. All three CI gates green: pnpm lint (14 pre-existing warnings, unchanged), pnpm type-check (6/6 packages), pnpm test (14/14 existing tests across @tasks/shared, @tasks/database, @tasks/ai). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-06-02 11:07:50 -04:00
identity: identityRouter,
feat(invites): workspace_invites schema + tRPC router + role management (Task 2, part 1/2) Schema half of Task-workspace-invites-and-roles. Lands the table, the invites router (create/list/revoke/accept), and the two new workspaces procedures (updateMemberRole/removeMember). UI ships in part 2/2. This is a stable checkpoint for Task 3 (invite-recipient-autocomplete) to start building against — the procedure surface area is frozen and the new identity helper from Task 1 is in the accept path. Schema: * workspace_invites: id, workspace_id, email (lowercased), role (owner/admin/member), invited_by_user_id, token (base64url 32B), expires_at (DEFAULT now() + 14d), accepted_at, revoked_at, created_at. * Indexes: workspace_id, UNIQUE(token), and a PARTIAL UNIQUE on (workspace_id, email) WHERE accepted_at IS NULL AND revoked_at IS NULL. An open invite is unique per (workspace, email); closed invites (accepted or revoked) fall out of the constraint so re-invites work. * Drizzle relations wired: workspaceInvites.workspace, workspaceInvites.invitedBy, workspaces.invites. * Migration 0006_broad_lethal_legion applied to dev DB. invites router: * create({email, role}) on workspaceProcedure (owner/admin only). Generates a base64url token from 32 random bytes via node:crypto. Idempotent on (workspace, email) — if an open invite already exists, returns it instead of inserting (the partial unique would block it anyway). Refuses self-invite. Refuses if the email is already a member. * list() returns pending (non-accepted, non-revoked) invites with inviter name/email joined for UI display. * revoke({inviteId}) authorizes against the invite's workspace, not the caller's input (the inviteId carries its own tenant scope). * accept({token}) is protectedProcedure (no workspace handle). Calls userOwnsEmail() from Task 1 — if the caller doesn't own the invited email under any of their verified identities, throws FORBIDDEN with a structured cause ({reason: "email_not_owned", invitedEmail}) so the redeem page can render the "link this email" explainer. Handles expiry, revoked, already-accepted states with clear messages. Idempotent on existing membership — if you've already been added by another flow, accept just closes the invite without re-inserting. workspaces additions: * updateMemberRole: admin/owner only. Three guards: 1. Can't change your own role (avoids accidental lockout). 2. Can't demote the only owner-role member (would leave the membership-level ownership empty even though workspaces.owner_user_id still points there — see ADR-pragmatic decision documented in the Task-multi-email-identity convoy discussion). 3. Only owners can promote to owner; admins move people between admin/member but cannot create a new owner. * removeMember: admin/owner OR self (the leave-workspace affordance). Same last-owner guard. Admins can't remove owners (only owners can, via demote-then-remove). Wired both new routers into root.ts as `invites` and `identity` (identity was landed in Task 1; this commit just keeps the registration visible alongside invites). All three CI gates green: 0 lint errors, 14 unchanged warnings, 6/6 type-check, 14/14 tests (no new tests yet — apps/web vitest harness is filed as Task-bootstrap-vitest-for-apps-web P2). Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-06-02 11:27:44 -04:00
invites: invitesRouter,
audit: auditRouter,
runs: runsRouter,
backlog: backlogRouter,
});
export type AppRouter = typeof appRouter;
export const createCaller = createCallerFactory(appRouter);