deckhearth/pages/api/user/password.js
Randall Stillwell a84373642e fix(security): drop wildcard CORS + redundant OPTIONS from 24 API routes (P0 #5)
Closes P0 #5 (CORS) from PARTIAL → RESOLVED. fix-auth-bypass
Brief 4 (commit 297afca) cleaned login + register; this brief
sweeps the remaining 24 pages/api/** handlers that carried the
identical scaffolded wildcard-CORS + redundant-OPTIONS pattern,
plus adds a blocking forbidden-cors-headers CI job to lock in
the cleanup against future regression.

Per architect Decision 1 — Option B (sweep all 24 in one PR)
chosen over Option A (narrow verify.js-only + queue separate
sweep). Pattern-drift audit (14 of 24 files spot-checked across
parent + architect) found zero drift; mechanical safety
confirmed.

Per Decision 2 — OPTIONS handler deleted entirely (matches
Brief 4 precedent). Same-origin Vercel deployment doesn't
preflight; method check at top of handler returns 405 if any
client ever sends OPTIONS again.

Per Decision 3 — verify.js's overly-permissive Allow-Methods:
'GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS' is moot (deleted under D2);
the handler's existing `if (req.method !== 'GET') return 405`
guard at line 17 (now line ~5) is the remaining gate.

Per Decision 4 — no new per-route tests this convoy. None of
the 24 routes have vitest coverage today; adding handler-level
tests is the queued fill-vitest-handler-coverage convoy.

Per Decision 5 — new `forbidden-cors-headers` CI job added,
modeled verbatim on `forbidden-endpoints`. Blocking (no
`|| true`, no `continue-on-error`). Greps pages/api/ for any
`Access-Control-Allow-(Origin|Methods|Headers)` reappearance
and exits 1 on hit.

Verification:
  - npm run lint: 128 problems (baseline match)
  - npm run test:run: 21/21 vitest pass (no regression)
  - git grep -nE "Access-Control-Allow-..." -- 'pages/api/**':
    zero matches
  - git grep -nE "OPTIONS" -- 'pages/api/**': zero matches
    (post-sweep)
  - new forbidden-cors-headers grep exits 0 against swept tree

No code paths in lib/**, components/**, scripts/**, or test/**
touched. No package.json / lockfile churn. No workflow YAML
beyond the single ci.yml job addition. No AGENTS.md edits
(doc-writer pass at convoy close).

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-05-24 20:24:47 -05:00

64 lines
No EOL
1.9 KiB
JavaScript

import { sql } from '@vercel/postgres';
import bcrypt from 'bcryptjs';
import { getUserFromRequest } from '../../../lib/permission-middleware';
export default async function handler(req, res) {
if (req.method !== 'PUT') {
return res.status(405).json({ error: 'Method not allowed' });
}
try {
// Get authenticated user
const user = await getUserFromRequest(req);
if (!user) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication required' });
}
const { current_password, new_password } = req.body;
// Validate input
if (!current_password || !new_password) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Current password and new password are required' });
}
if (new_password.length < 8) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'New password must be at least 8 characters long' });
}
// Get current user password
const userResult = await sql`
SELECT password FROM users WHERE id = ${user.userId}
`;
if (userResult.rows.length === 0) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'User not found' });
}
const currentHashedPassword = userResult.rows[0].password;
// Verify current password
const isCurrentPasswordValid = await bcrypt.compare(current_password, currentHashedPassword);
if (!isCurrentPasswordValid) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Current password is incorrect' });
}
// Hash new password
const saltRounds = 12;
const newHashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash(new_password, saltRounds);
// Update password
await sql`
UPDATE users
SET
password = ${newHashedPassword},
updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE id = ${user.userId}
`;
res.status(200).json({ message: 'Password updated successfully' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('Password change error:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
}
}