Closes the pick-a-name convoy. Applies D1-D5 + Risk 4 PRESERVE per
operator gate-1 ratification.
Infrastructure renames:
- lib/rate-limit.js: 5 Redis key prefixes tcgvault:* → deckhearth:* (D5).
One-time per-15-min / per-1-hour counter reset accepted; no user impact
because counter windows are short anyway. Existing rate-limit state in
Upstash will accumulate at the new prefix on first request.
- package.json: name field tcg-vault → deck-hearth (D2)
- package-lock.json: regenerated for the name change; STOP-on-churn
protocol confirmed only the two name lines changed (no dep churn)
- All three test users (admin/alice/bob) renamed to @deckhearth.com (D4)
- One-off migration script scripts/migrations/2026-05-24-rename-admin-
email.js (NEW): ESM, idempotent, UNIQUE-collision-safe. Per the
no-go-zones rule for new migrations. Operator MUST run post-deploy.
- README.md + TESTING_GUIDE.md operator-caveat blockquotes flagged
- pages/login.js demo-credential pre-fill updated
PRESERVED per Risk 4:
- test/lib/permission-middleware.test.js literal admin@tcgvault.com
with 7-line architect-authored "why" comment block. This is the
documented pre-fix-auth-bypass bug shape; the regression-lock
literal stays as historical truth.
Verification:
- npm run lint: 128 problems (baseline preserved)
- npm run test:run: 21/21 pass (preserved literal keeps green)
- Grep across full repo: 0 hits for TCG Vault / tcgvault / tcg-vault
except the explicit preserve in the test file + .convoys/ historical
- lib/rate-limit.js: 5 deckhearth: prefixes, 0 tcgvault: prefixes
- node --check on the new migration script: exit 0
- git diff package-lock.json: only the 2 "name": lines changed (no churn)
Operator post-merge action:
- Run `node scripts/migrations/2026-05-24-rename-admin-email.js` against
the production Neon DB. Order matters: migration FIRST, then any
subsequent `npm run setup-db` invocation. Migration script will refuse
to run if collision detected (means setup-db already ran post-rename).
Architect brief: .convoys/pick-a-name/brief-2-infrastructure-and-email-migration.md
Architect commit: 50ce9ab
Operator gate-1: D1-D5 + Risk 4 PRESERVE ratified.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
99 lines
3.5 KiB
JavaScript
99 lines
3.5 KiB
JavaScript
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
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import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
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vi.mock('@vercel/postgres', () => ({ sql: vi.fn() }));
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import { sql } from '@vercel/postgres';
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import { JWT_SECRET } from '../../lib/auth-secret.js';
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import { getUserFromRequest } from '../../lib/permission-middleware.js';
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function makeToken(payload, opts = {}) {
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return jwt.sign(payload, JWT_SECRET, { expiresIn: opts.expiresIn ?? '1h' });
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}
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describe('getUserFromRequest', () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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sql.mockReset();
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sql.mockResolvedValue({ rows: [] });
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vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {});
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});
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it('returns null when the Authorization header is missing', async () => {
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const user = await getUserFromRequest({ headers: {} });
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expect(user).toBeNull();
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expect(sql).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('returns null when the Authorization header is not a Bearer scheme', async () => {
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const user = await getUserFromRequest({
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headers: { authorization: 'Basic foo' },
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});
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expect(user).toBeNull();
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expect(sql).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('returns null when the token is malformed', async () => {
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const user = await getUserFromRequest({
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headers: { authorization: 'Bearer not-a-jwt' },
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});
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expect(user).toBeNull();
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expect(sql).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('returns null when the token signature uses a wrong secret', async () => {
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const token = jwt.sign({ userId: 1 }, 'other-secret', { expiresIn: '1h' });
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const user = await getUserFromRequest({
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headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
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});
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expect(user).toBeNull();
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expect(sql).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('returns null when the token is expired', async () => {
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const token = makeToken({ userId: 1 }, { expiresIn: '-1s' });
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const user = await getUserFromRequest({
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headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
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});
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expect(user).toBeNull();
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expect(sql).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('returns null when the token is valid but no user row matches', async () => {
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sql.mockResolvedValue({ rows: [] });
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const token = makeToken({ userId: 42 });
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const user = await getUserFromRequest({
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headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
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});
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expect(user).toBeNull();
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expect(sql).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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});
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it('returns the user object when the token is valid and the user row exists', async () => {
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sql.mockResolvedValue({
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rows: [{ id: 42, email: 'a@b.c', role: 'user' }],
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});
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const token = makeToken({ userId: 42 });
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const user = await getUserFromRequest({
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headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
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});
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expect(user).toEqual({ userId: 42, email: 'a@b.c', role: 'user' });
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expect(sql).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
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});
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it('does NOT return the synthetic admin shape when no Authorization header is present (Brief 2 regression lock)', async () => {
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const user = await getUserFromRequest({ headers: {} });
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// Email literal is the OLD `admin@tcgvault.com` (pre-`pick-a-name`
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// convoy, 2026-05-24) — preserved as the exact pre-fix-auth-bypass
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// synthetic-admin shape this assertion locks against. The
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// `.toBeNull()` check below is the strong contract; this soft check
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// documents the historical bug. Do NOT update to
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// `admin@deckhearth.com` — that would weaken the regression-lock to
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// a shape that never actually existed.
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expect(user).not.toEqual({
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userId: 1,
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email: 'admin@tcgvault.com',
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role: 'admin',
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});
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expect(user).toBeNull();
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});
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});
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