ac8c998935
Mechanical sweep of 7 internal files — AGENTS.md branding note, two
Cursor rules (ui-and-theming, auth-and-permissions), scripts/README.md,
two pages/api/cards/import-* User-Agent strings, scripts/import-lorcana.js
comment block. Applies D1 (Deck Hearth) + D2 (deck-hearth) per operator
gate-1 ratification.
EXCLUDES (B2 owns): lib/rate-limit.js Redis prefix, package.json name,
package-lock.json regen, README.md, TESTING_GUIDE.md, three seed scripts,
pages/login.js demo-credential pre-fill, test/lib/permission-middleware
regression-lock literal (PRESERVED per Risk 4).
Verification:
- npm run lint: 128 problems (baseline preserved)
- npm run test:run: 21/21 pass
- Grep: 0 hits for `TCG Vault` in B1's seven files; expected B2 hits remain
- git diff --name-only matches B1 spec exactly
Architect brief: .convoys/pick-a-name/brief-1-display-and-comment-sweep.md
Architect commit: 50ce9ab
Operator gate-1: D1+D2 ratified.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
69 lines
4.5 KiB
Text
69 lines
4.5 KiB
Text
---
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description: Auth model + permission model for Deck Hearth (JWT + collection roles)
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globs: pages/api/**/*.js,lib/*.js,components/*.js,pages/*.js
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---
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# Auth + permissions
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There are three parallel client-side auth implementations and one server-side helper. New code should use the canonical set listed below; don't proliferate variants.
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## Canonical surface (use these)
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| Concern | Module |
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| --- | --- |
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| Server: extract user from request | `lib/permission-middleware.js::getUserFromRequest` |
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| Server: gate a collection route | `lib/permission-middleware.js::withCollectionPermission` |
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| Server: log collection mutation | `lib/permission-middleware.js::logCollectionActivity` |
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| Server: JWT secret + canonical TTL | `lib/auth-secret.js` (`JWT_SECRET`, `JWT_TOKEN_TTL`) — single source of truth, fail-loud on unset env |
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| Server: token / password primitives | `pages/api/auth-utils.js` (`generateToken`, `verifyToken`, `hashPassword`, `verifyPassword`) — reads secret + TTL from `lib/auth-secret.js` |
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| Server: rate-limit auth endpoints | `lib/rate-limit.js::checkAuthRateLimit` (5 attempts / 15 min sliding window via `@upstash/ratelimit`) |
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| Client: hook | `lib/use-auth.js::useAuth` |
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| Client: route protection | `components/ProtectedRoute.js` |
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| Client: admin route protection | `components/AdminProtected.js` |
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## Legacy (do not extend)
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- `lib/auth-context.js::AuthProvider` + `useAuth` — older context. Still wired in `pages/_app.js`; left in place for compatibility. Don't add new consumers.
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- `lib/admin-auth.js::AdminProvider` + `useAdmin` + `useIsAdmin` — parallel admin context. Same story.
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A convoy is planned to collapse these three into one provider + one hook.
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## Token model
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- JWT in localStorage under the key `auth_token`.
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- Signed with `JWT_SECRET` (HS256), **24-hour expiry** (canonical `JWT_TOKEN_TTL = '24h'` from `lib/auth-secret.js`), payload `{ userId, email, role }`.
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- Sent on every authenticated fetch as `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
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- Verified server-side with `jsonwebtoken.verify(token, JWT_SECRET)` (or `verifyToken` from `pages/api/auth-utils.js`).
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**`JWT_SECRET` MUST be set in the deploy environment.** `lib/auth-secret.js` is the only place either `JWT_SECRET` or `JWT_TOKEN_TTL` is defined; the module **throws at import time** if `process.env.JWT_SECRET` is unset, which fails the request loudly rather than silently signing with a literal fallback. (The legacy `'your-secret-key-change-in-production'` fallback was duplicated across 7 files pre-`fix-auth-bypass`; that whole pattern is gone — do not reintroduce it.)
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## Roles
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Two role surfaces are in play:
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1. **User role** — `users.role` column, values `'user'` or `'admin'`. Admin gates `/admin/*` pages and admin-only API endpoints.
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2. **Collection role** — `collection_permissions.role` (`viewer` / `editor` / `owner`) + `collections.is_public` (anonymous viewer access). Resolved by `checkCollectionPermission` in priority order: owner → public-viewer → explicit row.
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When introducing a new permission tier, update both `checkRolePermission`'s hierarchy AND every gate that reads `is_public`.
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## Authentication state on the client
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`useAuth()` returns `{ user, loading, login, logout, refresh }`. `user === null` means logged out; `loading === true` means token verification in flight. Always render against `loading === false` before deciding to redirect.
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## Server-side authorization patterns
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`getUserFromRequest` returns `{ userId, email, role }` for a valid Bearer token, or `null` for any other case (missing header, malformed token, wrong signature, expired token, unknown user id). **`null` means 401** — always early-return before doing anything that depends on the user:
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```js
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const user = await getUserFromRequest(req);
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if (!user) return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Authentication required' });
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```
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There is **no synthetic-admin fallback** for missing tokens. The old dev-mode behavior of returning user 1 as admin is gone (resolved by `fix-auth-bypass` Brief 2, commit `258e479`). Do not reintroduce it under any framing — `test/lib/permission-middleware.test.js` has a negative regression test that will fail if the synthetic-admin shape comes back.
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From there:
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- **Owner-only** (delete, settings): inside the handler, `if (user.userId !== resource.user_id) return res.status(403)`.
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- **Editor-or-owner**: use `withCollectionPermission('editor')`.
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- **Public read**: use `withCollectionPermission('viewer')` — handles `is_public` and explicit-permission case.
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- **Admin-only**: check `user.role === 'admin'` directly; consider extracting `withAdmin()` if a third call site appears.
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