Closes the operator caveat from the `drop-public-setup` convoy: deployed
envs that ran `npm run setup-db` BEFORE `ff80753` (2026-05-22) still
carry the historical `admin123` bcrypt hash. The seed is idempotent
(`ON CONFLICT (email) DO NOTHING`), so re-running setup-db is a no-op
on existing rows.
## Design — D1: which option from the 3-option menu?
| Option | Picked? | Why |
|---|---|---|
| A. Close as no-op (defer rotation to manual app login) | No | Leaves a real-world residue if any pre-drop-public-setup env still exists — and an audit is harder than just shipping the script. |
| B. One-shot parameterized rotation script | **Yes** | Tightly scoped (~120 lines). Audit-trail-preserving (`updated_at` bump). Reusable for future rotations. No new auth surface in the app. |
| C. First-login forced password reset flow in the app | No | Right product answer, but heavier scope (new route, new flag column, UI work). Deferred as the queued `force-admin-password-reset-flow` convoy. |
## Script shape
`scripts/rotate-admin-password.js`:
- Reads `POSTGRES_URL` + `ADMIN_NEW_PASSWORD` from env (or `.env.local`).
- Optional `ADMIN_EMAIL` override; defaults to `admin@deckhearth.com`.
Pass `admin@tcgvault.com` for envs that pre-date `pick-a-name`
(squash `9abbab6`, 2026-05-24).
- Fail-loud-exits BEFORE opening any DB connection if:
- `POSTGRES_URL` is unset
- `ADMIN_NEW_PASSWORD` is unset or empty
- `ADMIN_NEW_PASSWORD` is shorter than 12 chars
- Validates the target row EXISTS AND has `role = 'admin'` before
touching it. Refuses to rotate non-admin rows even if `ADMIN_EMAIL`
points at one. Refuses to rotate when multiple rows match (impossible
given the UNIQUE(email) constraint, but checked anyway).
- Hashes with bcryptjs at 12 rounds — same as `setup-neon-db.js`.
- After UPDATE, re-fetches the row and runs `bcrypt.compare(newPassword,
row.password_hash)`; exits non-zero if the compare fails (extremely
unlikely, but catches silent UPDATE failures).
- NEVER echoes the password to stdout / stderr / shell history. The
only output is the row id, email, role, and updated_at.
Same import shape as the existing `scripts/migrations/2026-05-24-rename-admin-email.js`
(ESM, `dotenv.config({ path: '.env.local' })`, `import { neon } from
'@neondatabase/serverless'`, tagged-template SQL) — keeps the "11
scripts/* using neon() directly" graveyard from gaining new patterns;
fits the `purge-neondatabase-serverless-fully` follow-up convoy's
existing audit shape.
## Out of scope
- Sibling test users (alice / bob in `scripts/create-test-users.js`) —
dev fixtures, not real auth surfaces. Documented inline + in
AGENTS.md Gotcha #4.
- First-login forced password reset flow — deferred as the queued
`force-admin-password-reset-flow` convoy (it's the right product
answer, but heavier scope than this hygiene PR).
- Email rotation (already handled by
`scripts/migrations/2026-05-24-rename-admin-email.js`).
## Test plan
- [x] `node --check scripts/rotate-admin-password.js` — syntax OK
- [x] `npm run lint` — clean (1 pre-existing unrelated warning)
- [x] `npm run test:run` — 118 tests pass
- [ ] CI on this PR
- [ ] Operator-side smoke test (NOT covered by CI):
- Set `ADMIN_NEW_PASSWORD=test-rotation-12chars` against a throwaway
Neon branch DB, run the script, log in via the app with the new
password, run the script again with a different password, log in
again. Skip if there's no convenient throwaway DB.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
167 lines
6.5 KiB
JavaScript
167 lines
6.5 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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/**
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* One-shot admin-password rotation.
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*
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* Closes the operator caveat from the `drop-public-setup` convoy: any
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* deployed env that ran `scripts/setup-neon-db.js` BEFORE that convoy
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* (commit `ff80753`, 2026-05-22) still carries the historical
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* `admin123` bcrypt hash in `users.password_hash` for the admin row.
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* The seed is idempotent (`ON CONFLICT (email) DO NOTHING`), so
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* re-running `npm run setup-db` does NOT rotate the password — it
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* just no-ops on the existing row.
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*
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* This script is the deliberate, audit-trail-preserving alternative
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* to "log into the app and change the password manually": it leaves
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* an `updated_at` timestamp on the row, validates the target row is
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* actually an admin before touching it, and verifies the hash matches
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* post-update.
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*
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* Usage:
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*
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* POSTGRES_URL=... \
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* ADMIN_NEW_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -base64 24) \
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* node scripts/rotate-admin-password.js
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*
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* # Or via .env.local with both vars set:
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* node scripts/rotate-admin-password.js
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*
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* Required env:
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* - POSTGRES_URL — Neon connection string (same shape as
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* `npm run setup-db` uses).
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* - ADMIN_NEW_PASSWORD — new plaintext password. The script
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* fail-loud-exits BEFORE opening any DB
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* connection if this is unset, empty, or
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* shorter than 12 chars.
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*
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* Optional env:
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* - ADMIN_EMAIL — defaults to `admin@deckhearth.com`. Use
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* this if your env still has the legacy
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* `admin@tcgvault.com` row (pre-`pick-a-name`
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* convoy, 2026-05-24). Run the email-rename
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* migration first if so:
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* node scripts/migrations/2026-05-24-rename-admin-email.js
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*
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* Safety guarantees:
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* - Validates the target row exists AND has `role = 'admin'` before
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* touching it (refuses to rotate a non-admin row even if you point
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* ADMIN_EMAIL at it).
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* - Never echoes the password to stdout / stderr / shell history.
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* The only stdout output is the rotation status + the row's id /
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* email / role / updated_at.
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* - Verifies the new hash matches the supplied plaintext via
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* `bcrypt.compare` after the UPDATE, before exiting clean. If the
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* compare fails (extremely unlikely), exits non-zero so the
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* operator knows to investigate.
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*
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* NOT in scope (intentionally):
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* - Rotating alice / bob test-user passwords (they live in
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* `scripts/create-test-users.js` and are dev/test fixtures).
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* - A "first-login forced rotation" feature in the app (heavier
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* scope; would be the `force-admin-password-reset-flow` convoy).
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*/
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import dotenv from 'dotenv';
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dotenv.config({ path: '.env.local' });
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import { neon } from '@neondatabase/serverless';
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import bcrypt from 'bcryptjs';
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const MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 12;
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const BCRYPT_ROUNDS = 12;
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async function main() {
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const postgresUrl = process.env.POSTGRES_URL;
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const newPassword = process.env.ADMIN_NEW_PASSWORD;
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const targetEmail = process.env.ADMIN_EMAIL || 'admin@deckhearth.com';
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if (!postgresUrl) {
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console.error('❌ POSTGRES_URL is not set. Set it in .env.local or pass inline.');
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process.exit(1);
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}
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if (!newPassword || newPassword.length === 0) {
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console.error('❌ ADMIN_NEW_PASSWORD is not set. Generate one with:');
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console.error(' openssl rand -base64 24');
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console.error(' Then re-run:');
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console.error(' ADMIN_NEW_PASSWORD=<value> node scripts/rotate-admin-password.js');
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process.exit(1);
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}
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if (newPassword.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
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console.error(`❌ ADMIN_NEW_PASSWORD must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters. Got ${newPassword.length}.`);
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process.exit(1);
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}
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const sql = neon(postgresUrl);
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// `@neondatabase/serverless` returns rows directly (NOT wrapped in
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// { rows, rowCount } like `@vercel/postgres`). Same pattern as
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// scripts/migrations/2026-05-24-rename-admin-email.js.
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const before = await sql`
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SELECT id, email, role, updated_at
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FROM users
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WHERE email = ${targetEmail}
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`;
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if (before.length === 0) {
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console.error(`❌ No user found with email '${targetEmail}'.`);
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console.error(' If you ran setup-db before the pick-a-name convoy (2026-05-24),');
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console.error(' the admin row may still be at admin@tcgvault.com. Run the');
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console.error(' email-rename migration first:');
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console.error(' node scripts/migrations/2026-05-24-rename-admin-email.js');
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console.error(' Or pass ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@tcgvault.com to target the legacy row.');
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process.exit(1);
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}
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if (before.length > 1) {
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console.error(`❌ Found ${before.length} rows matching '${targetEmail}'. The users.email column has a UNIQUE constraint so this should be impossible. Investigate manually.`);
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process.exit(1);
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}
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const row = before[0];
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if (row.role !== 'admin') {
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console.error(`❌ Refusing to rotate password: row '${targetEmail}' (id=${row.id}) has role='${row.role}', not 'admin'. This script only rotates admin rows.`);
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process.exit(1);
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}
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console.log(`Found admin row: id=${row.id} email=${row.email} updated_at=${row.updated_at?.toISOString?.() ?? row.updated_at}`);
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const hashedPassword = await bcrypt.hash(newPassword, BCRYPT_ROUNDS);
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await sql`
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UPDATE users
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SET password_hash = ${hashedPassword},
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updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
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WHERE id = ${row.id}
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AND email = ${targetEmail}
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AND role = 'admin'
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`;
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// Re-fetch + verify the new hash matches the supplied plaintext.
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const after = await sql`
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SELECT id, email, role, password_hash, updated_at
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FROM users
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WHERE id = ${row.id}
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`;
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if (after.length !== 1) {
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console.error(`❌ Post-update fetch returned ${after.length} rows. Investigate manually.`);
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process.exit(1);
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}
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const matches = await bcrypt.compare(newPassword, after[0].password_hash);
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if (!matches) {
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console.error('❌ Post-update bcrypt.compare returned false. The UPDATE may have failed silently. Investigate manually.');
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process.exit(1);
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}
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console.log(`✅ Rotated password for admin row id=${row.id} email=${row.email}.`);
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console.log(` New updated_at: ${after[0].updated_at?.toISOString?.() ?? after[0].updated_at}`);
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console.log(' The new password is NOT echoed; store it in your secret manager.');
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}
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main().catch((err) => {
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console.error('❌ Rotation failed:', err);
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process.exit(1);
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});
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