fix(security): stop leaking Gemini API key to browsers

Delete the public /api/config/gemini endpoint and remove client auto-load
paths so GEMINI_AI_API_KEY stays server-side only. Add a scan rate-limit
class for the upcoming server-side identify route and a CI gate that blocks
reintroducing config key leaks or new browser LLM URLs.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

.convoys/add-real-ocr-layer.md

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+---
+name: add-real-ocr-layer
+classification: feature
+success_metric: |
+  ≥70% of legitimate scans resolve at Layer-1 (Tesseract + pg_trgm) with
+  zero Gemini calls; scan_attempts.layer distribution proves it.
+skip:
+  - ia
+status: open
+created: 2026-05-27
+depends_on:
+  - server-side-scan-pipeline
+---
+
+# Convoy: add-real-ocr-layer
+
+Add a cheap local OCR + fuzzy DB match layer so most scans never hit Gemini.
+
+## Why
+
+Every scan today (post convoy #2) calls Gemini Flash server-side. That is
+slow, costs money, and hits rate limits under bulk scanning. The audit
+proposed a two-layer pipeline: Layer-1 runs Tesseract on the card name strip
++ `pg_trgm` similarity against `cards.name`; only escalates to
+`/api/scan/identify` (Gemini) when confidence is low. Target: **≥70%
+Layer-1 hit rate** measured via `scan_attempts.layer`.
+
+## Scope
+
+### In scope
+
+- **Migration** — enable `pg_trgm` extension; GIN index on
+  `cards (name gin_trgm_ops)`.
+- **`pages/api/cards/identify-by-text.js`** (new):
+  - similarity > 0.85 → single match
+  - 0.6–0.85 → disambiguation list
+  - < 0.6 → `{ escalate: true }` (client falls back to `/api/scan/identify`)
+- **`tesseract.js`** dependency + **`lib/ocr-worker.js`** (new) — browser
+  Worker wrapping Tesseract; OCR name strip before API calls.
+- **`components/CameraScanner.js`** — integrate Worker: try Layer-1 path
+  first, escalate on low confidence.
+- **`docs/SCHEMA_MAP.md`** — index + extension documented.
+- **`.github/workflows/ci.yml`** — piggyback fix: extend `schema-map-fresh`
+  job `if:` condition to include `migrations/**` paths (currently only
+  watches `scripts/add-*`, `scripts/fix-*`, `setup-neon-db.js`, and
+  `docs/SCHEMA_MAP.md` — misses post-`migration-tool` migrations).
+
+### Out of scope
+
+- **OpenCV perspective transform / card boundary detection** — queue
+  `improve-scan-card-detection` if Layer-1 hit rate stays below 70% after
+  this lands.
+- **Retraining or custom ML models** — Tesseract + trigram is sufficient
+  for v1.
+- **Scanner UX redesign** — convoy `redesign-scanner-flow` (#4).
+
+## Roles invoked
+
+1. `role-ux-reviewer` — Layer-1 vs escalation feedback (scanning status).
+2. `role-architect` — similarity thresholds, Worker bundling, 2 briefs.
+3. `role-implementer` — 2 briefs (Brief 2 depends on Brief 1).
+4. `role-reviewer` + `role-design-system-auditor` + `role-a11y-auditor`.
+
+## Todos
+
+- [ ] Architect: ratify similarity thresholds + Worker load strategy
+- [ ] Brief 1 — migration (pg_trgm) + identify-by-text route + SCHEMA_MAP + CI schema-map-fresh fix
+- [ ] Brief 2 — Tesseract Worker + CameraScanner integration
+- [ ] Post-ship: measure `scan_attempts.layer` distribution for 70% target
+
+## Operator action required
+
+**None.** No new secrets. Tesseract runs client-side; pg_trgm is a Postgres
+extension enabled via migration.
+
+## Multitask dispatch
+
+### Slice dependencies
+
+```yaml
+slice_dependencies:
+  - brief: 1
+    depends_on: []
+    files:
+      - migrations/*
+      - pages/api/cards/identify-by-text.js
+      - docs/SCHEMA_MAP.md
+      - .github/workflows/ci.yml
+  - brief: 2
+    depends_on: [1]
+    files:
+      - components/CameraScanner.js
+      - lib/ocr-worker.js
+      - package.json
+```
+
+Serial dispatch: Brief 2 after Brief 1 (Worker calls identify-by-text route).
+
+Post-PR audit:
+
+```
+/multitask role-reviewer + role-design-system-auditor + role-a11y-auditor
+```
+
+Group id: `audit-add-real-ocr-layer-<pr>`.
+
+## CI impact
+
+| Workflow / job | Behavior |
+| --- | --- |
+| `schema-map-fresh` | **Modified** — `if:` paths include `migrations/**`. |
+| `forbidden-client-side-llm-keys` | Unchanged (no new client LLM URLs). |
+| `preview-smoke.yml` | Fires. |
+| `visual-diff.yml` | **Fires** — `components/CameraScanner.js` in paths. |
+
+No new grep gate. Total added CI time: ~0 beyond existing workflows.
+
+## Decisions to ratify (architect)
+
+1. **Similarity thresholds** — 0.85 / 0.6 defaults from audit; tune with
+   sample set.
+2. **Tesseract language data** — bundled vs CDN fetch; impact on first-load
+   latency.
+3. **`scan_attempts.layer` values** — recommend `1 | 2` (trgm vs gemini).
+
+## Known constraints
+
+- **`pg_trgm` on Neon** — verify extension availability on prod tier.
+- **Worker + Turbopack** — confirm `tesseract.js` Worker path works under
+  Next.js 16 default bundler; fallback `--webpack` only if architect
+  documents regression.
+- **Layer-1 must not block camera** — Worker runs off main thread.
+
+## Acceptance criteria
+
+1. Migration applies cleanly; GIN index exists on `cards.name`.
+2. `identify-by-text` returns match / disambig / escalate per thresholds.
+3. CameraScanner tries Layer-1 before `/api/scan/identify`.
+4. `scan_attempts.layer` populated for analytics.
+5. `schema-map-fresh` fires when only `migrations/` changes.
+6. Lint + vitest baseline preserved.
+
+## Out of scope follow-ups
+
+- **`improve-scan-card-detection`** — if Layer-1 hit rate < 70%.
+- **`god-component-split`** — CameraScanner remains large; split is P2.

.convoys/redesign-scanner-flow.md

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+---
+name: redesign-scanner-flow
+classification: feature
+success_metric: |
+  Scanner page uses a stack-destination model (one target at top, every scan
+  pours into it); per-card condition + foil + quantity captured and propagate
+  to destinations; "you already own N" ownership badge via /api/cards/[id]/ownership;
+  captured frame persisted to Vercel Blob and attached to user_cards.
+skip: []
+status: open
+created: 2026-05-27
+depends_on:
+  - server-side-scan-pipeline
+---
+
+# Convoy: redesign-scanner-flow
+
+Redesign the scanner session around a single destination stack, rich card
+metadata, ownership feedback, and persisted scan images.
+
+## Why
+
+The current scanner treats each card as an isolated add with no session
+context: users re-select destination every scan, cannot set condition/foil/
+quantity in bulk, get no feedback when they already own a card, and lose
+the captured frame after confirm. The audit flagged these as core UX gaps
+that block efficient bulk scanning at the table.
+
+## Scope
+
+### In scope
+
+- **Brief 1 — stack-destination UX + game pre-select**
+  - `pages/scanner.js` — session model: one chosen target at top; every
+    confirmed scan routes there.
+  - `components/ScannerDestinationPicker.js` (new) — collection / deck /
+    default collection picker with game filter.
+
+- **Brief 2 — condition / foil / quantity + ownership badge**
+  - `pages/scanner.js`, `components/ScannedCardItem.js` (extract from
+    scanner page).
+  - `pages/api/user-cards.js`, `pages/api/decks/[id]/cards.js`,
+    `pages/api/collections/[identifier]/cards.js` — accept `condition`,
+    `is_foil`, `quantity` body params on POST.
+  - Ownership badge via existing `pages/api/cards/[id]/ownership.js`.
+
+- **Brief 3 — captured image persistence**
+  - `pages/api/scan/upload-image.js` (new) — auth + Blob upload.
+  - `components/CameraScanner.js` — upload frame on confirm.
+  - `pages/api/user-cards.js` — accept `scan_image_url`.
+
+### Out of scope
+
+- **OCR / identify pipeline changes** — convoys #2 and #3.
+- **Vocabulary rename** ("My Collection" / "Lists") — convoy
+  `rename-collections-vocabulary` (#5).
+- **Schema cleanup** — global `cards.quantity` removal is
+  `schema-cleanup-from-scanner-audit`, not here.
+
+## Roles invoked
+
+1. `role-ia-architect` — destination stack model, nav labels.
+2. `role-ux-reviewer` — bulk-scan flow, ownership badge placement.
+3. `role-architect` — API param contract, 3 briefs.
+4. `role-implementer` — 3 briefs (Briefs 2+3 parallel after Brief 1).
+5. `role-reviewer` + `role-design-system-auditor` + `role-a11y-auditor`.
+
+## Todos
+
+- [ ] IA: stack-destination information architecture
+- [ ] UX: condition/foil/quantity controls + ownership badge
+- [ ] Architect: brief decomposition + API body-param contract
+- [ ] Brief 1 — destination picker + session state
+- [ ] Brief 2 — metadata + ownership (after Brief 1)
+- [ ] Brief 3 — Blob persistence (after Brief 1)
+- [ ] Design-system: verify theme tokens on new components
+
+## Operator action required
+
+**None.** Assumes `BLOB_READ_WRITE_TOKEN` is already provisioned (avatar
+upload path uses Blob today).
+
+## Multitask dispatch
+
+### Slice dependencies
+
+```yaml
+slice_dependencies:
+  - brief: 1
+    depends_on: []
+    files:
+      - pages/scanner.js
+      - components/ScannerDestinationPicker.js
+  - brief: 2
+    depends_on: [1]
+    files:
+      - pages/scanner.js
+      - components/ScannedCardItem.js
+      - pages/api/user-cards.js
+      - pages/api/decks/[id]/cards.js
+      - pages/api/collections/[identifier]/cards.js
+  - brief: 3
+    depends_on: [1]
+    files:
+      - pages/api/scan/upload-image.js
+      - components/CameraScanner.js
+      - pages/api/user-cards.js
+```
+
+**After Brief 1 merges:** `/multitask role-implementer briefs 2, 3`
+(disjoint file sets except shared `pages/scanner.js` / `user-cards.js` —
+architect must resolve: likely Brief 2 owns `scanner.js` queue UI, Brief 3
+owns CameraScanner + upload route only; adjust `files:` if conflict).
+
+Post-PR audit:
+
+```
+/multitask role-reviewer + role-design-system-auditor + role-a11y-auditor
+```
+
+Group id: `audit-redesign-scanner-flow-<pr>`.
+
+**Cross-convoy:** can run **parallel with #3** after #2 Brief 1+2 merge
+(disjoint primary surfaces).
+
+## CI impact
+
+| Workflow / job | Behavior |
+| --- | --- |
+| `preview-smoke.yml` | Fires. |
+| `visual-diff.yml` | **Fires** — `pages/scanner.js`, `components/**` match paths; `!pages/api/**` still allows page changes through. |
+| New grep gates | None. |
+
+## Decisions to ratify (architect)
+
+1. **Default destination** — last-used vs explicit pick-required on session start.
+2. **Condition enum** — align with existing `user_cards.condition` VARCHAR values.
+3. **Blob path convention** — e.g. `scans/{userId}/{uuid}.jpg`.
+4. **Brief 2 vs 3 file overlap** — split `pages/scanner.js` ownership to avoid multitask conflict.
+
+## Known constraints
+
+- **Theme tokens** — no hardcoded hex; use `var(--*)` per ui-and-theming rule.
+- **Rate limits** — upload-image may need `checkUploadRateLimit` if architect
+  classifies scan images as upload class (Decision pending).
+- **Mobile scanner** — destination picker must work on narrow viewports.
+
+## Acceptance criteria
+
+1. User selects one destination; all scans in session target it until changed.
+2. Condition, foil, quantity propagate on add-to-collection/deck/user-cards.
+3. Ownership badge shows when user already holds the card.
+4. Confirmed scan image URL stored on `user_cards` row.
+5. Lint + vitest baseline preserved.
+6. A11y: destination picker keyboard-operable; badge has accessible text.
+
+## Out of scope follow-ups
+
+- **`god-component-split`** — further split `pages/scanner.js` if still > 500 lines.
+- **`harden-multipart-parser`** — if upload-image uses multipart.

.convoys/rename-collections-vocabulary.md

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+---
+name: rename-collections-vocabulary
+classification: feature
+success_metric: |
+  UI copy reads "My Collection" (ownership) and "Lists" / "Binders" (curated
+  lists); no rendered string "Owned Cards" / "Mark Owned" / "All My Cards"
+  remains in pages/ or components/; schema unchanged; AGENTS.md extended
+  with vocabulary table.
+skip:
+  - arch
+status: open
+created: 2026-05-27
+---
+
+# Convoy: rename-collections-vocabulary
+
+Align user-facing copy with the product taxonomy: owned cards vs curated lists.
+
+## Why
+
+The scanner audit and IA review found inconsistent vocabulary: "Owned Cards",
+"Mark Owned", and "All My Cards" imply a different mental model than the
+schema (global `cards` catalog vs per-user ownership via `user_cards` vs
+curated `collections`). Users confuse "my collection" (everything I own) with
+"lists/binders" (curated subsets). This convoy is copy + docs only — no
+schema migration.
+
+## Scope
+
+### In scope
+
+- **Brief 1 — UI copy sweep** (~20 files in `pages/` + `components/`):
+  - Replace stale strings per vocabulary table (IA architect supplies full
+    inventory).
+  - Target removals: `"Owned Cards"`, `"Mark Owned"`, `"All My Cards"`.
+  - Canonical replacements: **"My Collection"** (ownership), **"Lists"** /
+    **"Binders"** (curated lists).
+- **Brief 2 — docs + rules**
+  - `AGENTS.md` § Branding — vocabulary table.
+  - `.cursor/rules/ui-and-theming.mdc` — copy conventions.
+  - `docs/SCHEMA_MAP.md` — clarify naming vs UI labels (no DDL change).
+- **`.github/workflows/ci.yml`** — new `forbidden-stale-strings` grep gate
+  (~30s): fail if `"Mark Owned"`, `"Owned Cards"`, or `"All My Cards"`
+  appear in `pages/` or `components/`.
+
+### Out of scope
+
+- **Schema renames** — table/column names stay; UI copy only.
+- **URL slug changes** — `/collections` path unchanged in v1.
+- **Architecture decisions** — `skip: arch`; IA + UX run explicitly.
+
+## Roles invoked
+
+1. `role-ia-architect` — vocabulary table + file inventory (**primary owner**).
+2. `role-ux-reviewer` — scan flow + nav label consistency.
+3. `role-implementer` — 2 briefs (serial: Brief 2 after Brief 1).
+4. `role-reviewer` + `role-design-system-auditor` + `role-a11y-auditor` —
+   copy changes affect screen reader strings.
+
+Note: **`role-architect` skipped** per `skip: arch`. IA architect owns
+taxonomy; implementer briefs written by IA + conductor handoff or parent
+agent.
+
+## Todos
+
+- [ ] IA: publish vocabulary table + grep inventory of stale strings
+- [ ] UX: review scanner + nav + collection views for consistency
+- [ ] Brief 1 — pages/ + components/ copy sweep
+- [ ] Brief 2 — AGENTS.md + rules + SCHEMA_MAP glossary
+- [ ] Add `forbidden-stale-strings` CI job
+
+## Operator action required
+
+**None.**
+
+## Multitask dispatch
+
+### Slice dependencies
+
+```yaml
+slice_dependencies:
+  - brief: 1
+    depends_on: []
+    files:
+      - pages/**/*.js
+      - components/*.js
+    notes: exclude pages/api/**
+  - brief: 2
+    depends_on: [1]
+    files:
+      - AGENTS.md
+      - .cursor/rules/ui-and-theming.mdc
+      - docs/SCHEMA_MAP.md
+      - .github/workflows/ci.yml
+```
+
+Serial: Brief 2 after Brief 1 (docs reference final copy).
+
+**Cross-convoy:** parallel with #1+#2 after `secure-scanner-gemini-key`
+merges — `/multitask role-implementer` **#5 Brief 1 + #6 + #2 Brief 1**
+(disjoint files).
+
+Post-PR audit:
+
+```
+/multitask role-reviewer + role-design-system-auditor + role-a11y-auditor
+```
+
+Group id: `audit-rename-collections-vocabulary-<pr>`.
+
+## CI impact
+
+| Workflow / job | Behavior |
+| --- | --- |
+| `forbidden-stale-strings` | **New blocking job** — grep `pages/` + `components/`. |
+| `visual-diff.yml` | **Likely fires** — widespread UI string changes in pages/components. |
+| `preview-smoke.yml` | Fires; sign-in CTA wording must stay smoke-compatible. |
+
+**Smoke caveat:** smoke test 2 asserts `/sign in/i` on login page — do not
+rename that CTA in this convoy.
+
+## Decisions to ratify (IA architect)
+
+1. **"Lists" vs "Binders"** — when to use each term in nav vs empty states.
+2. **Scanner button label** — replacement for "Mark Owned" (e.g. "Add to
+   session" vs "Confirm card").
+3. **Admin UI** — out of copy sweep or separate pass?
+
+## Acceptance criteria
+
+1. Zero rendered occurrences of the three forbidden strings in `pages/` +
+   `components/`.
+2. Vocabulary table committed in `AGENTS.md`.
+3. `forbidden-stale-strings` CI green.
+4. Schema DDL unchanged (grep `migrations/` — no new files).
+5. Vitest 21/21; smoke 3/3 (sign-in CTA intact).
+
+## Out of scope follow-ups
+
+- **`schema-cleanup-from-scanner-audit`** — `is_system_collection` vs
+  `user_cards` unification (separate convoy).
+- **`rename-repo-and-vercel-project`** — infra naming, not UI copy.

.convoys/scanner-correctness-polish.md

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+---
+name: scanner-correctness-polish
+classification: infra-only
+success_metric: |
+  Mark-Owned is idempotent (in-flight lock per queue row); bulk toolbar no
+  longer uses setTimeout(..., 100); pages/scanner.js imports lib/use-auth
+  not legacy auth-context; POST /api/collections/[identifier]/cards calls
+  logCollectionActivity('card_added', …).
+skip:
+  - ia
+  - ux
+  - visual
+  - a11y
+  - design
+status: open
+created: 2026-05-27
+---
+
+# Convoy: scanner-correctness-polish
+
+Fix scanner-page correctness bugs without changing UX or visual design.
+
+## Why
+
+The scanner audit surfaced non-security bugs that cause duplicate adds,
+racey bulk actions, a stale auth import, and missing activity logs. These
+are small fixes with high reliability impact during bulk scanning sessions.
+
+## Scope
+
+### In scope
+
+- **`pages/scanner.js`**
+  - Line 8: change import from legacy `lib/auth-context` to `lib/use-auth`
+    (should have been swept by `single-auth-provider`; scanner was missed or
+    regressed).
+  - **Mark-Owned idempotency** — in-flight lock per queue row so double-tap
+    / double-click cannot duplicate POSTs.
+  - **Bulk toolbar** — remove `setTimeout(..., 100)` race; await or use
+    proper batch completion signal.
+- **`pages/api/collections/[identifier]/cards.js`** — POST handler calls
+  `logCollectionActivity(collectionId, userId, 'card_added', details)` per
+  AGENTS.md convention.
+
+### Out of scope
+
+- **Scanner UX redesign** — convoy `redesign-scanner-flow` (#4).
+- **Copy / vocabulary** — convoy `rename-collections-vocabulary` (#5).
+- **OCR / identify pipeline** — convoys #2–#3.
+- **Visual or a11y changes** — none intended; diff should be behavior-only.
+
+## Roles invoked
+
+1. `role-architect` — single brief (lightweight; may be parent-owned given
+   infra-only classification).
+2. `role-implementer` — one brief.
+3. `role-reviewer` — post-PR only (design + a11y skipped).
+
+## Todos
+
+- [ ] Architect: brief-1 with exact line targets
+- [ ] Fix use-auth import on scanner page
+- [ ] Add per-row in-flight lock for Mark-Owned
+- [ ] Replace setTimeout bulk-toolbar pattern
+- [ ] Wire logCollectionActivity on collection card POST
+
+## Operator action required
+
+**None.**
+
+## Multitask dispatch
+
+Single brief — no implementer fan-out.
+
+**Cross-convoy parallelism:** after #1 merges, run alongside **#2 Brief 1**
+and **#5 Brief 1** — disjoint files (`pages/scanner.js` vs migrations vs
+copy sweep). Coordinate if both #6 and #5 touch `pages/scanner.js` (IA
+should sequence copy sweep after correctness or split files in briefs).
+
+Post-PR audit:
+
+```
+/multitask role-reviewer
+```
+
+Group id: `audit-scanner-correctness-polish-<pr>`.
+
+## CI impact
+
+| Workflow / job | Behavior |
+| --- | --- |
+| `ci.yml` | Standard lint + vitest; no new gates. |
+| `preview-smoke.yml` | Fires. |
+| `visual-diff.yml` | **May fire** if `pages/scanner.js` changes — behavior-only diff should not move pixels; baseline swallow if triggered. |
+
+## Known constraints
+
+- **`logCollectionActivity` import** — use existing helper from
+  permission-middleware or documented activity module; match sibling handlers.
+- **No UX copy changes** — button labels stay as-is until #5 (or avoid
+  overlapping scanner.js edits between #5 and #6).
+
+## Acceptance criteria
+
+1. `pages/scanner.js` imports from `lib/use-auth` only.
+2. Double-click Mark-Owned produces one POST.
+3. Bulk toolbar actions complete without setTimeout race.
+4. Collection card POST emits activity log row.
+5. Vitest 21/21; lint baseline preserved.

.convoys/secure-scanner-gemini-key.md

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+---
+name: secure-scanner-gemini-key
+classification: server-only
+success_metric: |
+  GEMINI_AI_API_KEY rotated; no endpoint returns the key to a browser;
+  lib/rate-limit.js exposes a sixth scan class (5 req / 1 min, user-keyed);
+  forbidden-client-side-llm-keys CI gate green.
+skip:
+  - ia
+  - ux
+  - visual
+  - a11y
+  - design
+status: in-progress
+created: 2026-05-27
+---
+
+# Convoy: secure-scanner-gemini-key
+
+Stop leaking the Gemini API key to browsers and add a scan-specific rate
+limiter before the server-side scan pipeline lands in convoy #2.
+
+## Why
+
+The scanner audit found that `pages/api/config/gemini.js` returns
+`process.env.GEMINI_AI_API_KEY` to any authenticated caller, and
+`components/CameraScanner.js` auto-fetches that endpoint on mount (lines
+53–67). A logged-in user — or anyone who obtains a session token — can
+read the production LLM key from DevTools and call Gemini directly,
+bypassing app rate limits and billing controls. This is a **live secret
+exposure** that must be closed before any further scanner work ships.
+
+## Scope
+
+### In scope
+
+- **Delete** `pages/api/config/gemini.js` — remove the key-returning
+  endpoint entirely.
+- **`components/CameraScanner.js`** — remove the auto-load block at lines
+  53–67 that fetches `/api/config/gemini` and stores the key client-side.
+  The scanner will break temporarily until convoy #2 lands; that is
+  acceptable for the security-only window.
+- **`lib/rate-limit.js`** — add a sixth `scan` entry to `LIMITER_CONFIG`
+  (5 req / 1 min, user-keyed) and export `checkScanRateLimit(req,
+  userId)` following the Decision-2 hybrid named-limiter pattern from
+  `.convoys/add-rate-limiting.md`. Redis prefix: `deckhearth:scan`.
+- **`.github/workflows/ci.yml`** — add a new blocking
+  `forbidden-client-side-llm-keys` job (~30s grep gate, same shape as
+  `forbidden-cors-headers`):
+  - Fail if `apiKey:` appears under `pages/api/config/*`.
+  - Fail if `generativelanguage.googleapis.com` or `api.openai.com`
+    appears outside `pages/api/` (client-side LLM URL leakage).
+- **`.cursor/rules/api-routes.mdc`** § Rate limiting — document the new
+  `scan` class (architect may fold into brief or defer to convoy #2;
+  implementer should at minimum add the lib export).
+
+### Out of scope
+
+- **`/api/scan/identify`** server route — convoy `server-side-scan-pipeline` (#2).
+- **Deleting `lib/ai-ocr.js` browser classes** (`GeminiVisionOCR`,
+  `AICardOCR`, etc.) — deferred to #2 to avoid breaking the live scanner
+  during this security-only window (the client still needs those classes
+  until the server pipeline replaces them).
+- **Rotating the key in source control** — the key lives in Vercel env
+  only; rotation is operator action (see below).
+
+## Roles invoked
+
+1. `role-architect` — ratify scan limiter values; confirm grep patterns
+   for the CI gate; single brief decomposition.
+2. `role-implementer` — one brief, no fan-out.
+3. `role-reviewer` — post-PR audit (design + a11y skipped per `skip:`).
+
+## Todos
+
+- [ ] Architect: write `.convoys/secure-scanner-gemini-key/brief-1-*.md`
+- [x] Implementer: delete config endpoint + client auto-load; extend rate-limit lib
+- [x] Implementer: add `forbidden-client-side-llm-keys` CI job
+- [x] Operator: rotate `GEMINI_AI_API_KEY` in Google AI Studio + Vercel **before merge**
+- [ ] Reviewer: verify no key material in diff or CI logs
+
+## Operator action required
+
+**URGENT — rotate before merge:**
+
+1. **Google AI Studio** — revoke the current `GEMINI_AI_API_KEY` and
+   issue a new key. The old key has been exposed to every browser session
+   that loaded the scanner page.
+2. **Vercel** — update the `GEMINI_AI_API_KEY` env var on Production +
+   Preview to the new value.
+3. **Verify** — after deploy, confirm `GET /api/config/gemini` returns
+   404 and no network tab in the scanner shows key material.
+
+Do **not** merge this PR until rotation is complete. The CI gate prevents
+re-introduction of the leak pattern but does not invalidate a key that
+was already exfiltrated.
+
+## Multitask dispatch
+
+Single brief — **no implementer fan-out**.
+
+Post-PR audit fan-out:
+
+```
+/multitask role-reviewer
+```
+
+Group id: `audit-secure-scanner-gemini-key-<pr>` (design-system + a11y
+auditors skipped per `skip:` flags).
+
+**Cross-convoy parallelism (after #1 merges):** open three worktrees and
+`/multitask role-implementer` on **#2 Brief 1 + #5 Brief 1 + #6 (sole
+brief)** — disjoint file sets (migrations / UI strings / scanner polish).
+
+## CI impact
+
+| Workflow / job | Behavior |
+| --- | --- |
+| `ci.yml` → `forbidden-client-side-llm-keys` | **New blocking job.** ~30s grep; no `npm ci`. |
+| `ci.yml` → lint, vitest, forbidden-endpoints, forbidden-cors-headers | Unchanged; must stay green. |
+| `preview-smoke.yml` | Fires (no `paths:` filter). Scanner page may error until #2; smoke spec does not exercise scanner. |
+| `visual-diff.yml` | **Does not fire** — API-only + `lib/` + CI YAML; `!pages/api/**` exclusion applies. |
+
+**Preserve `pipeline: skip smoke`** PR-body directive for iterative pushes.

.convoys/server-side-scan-pipeline.md

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+---
+name: server-side-scan-pipeline
+classification: feature
+success_metric: |
+  Scanner identifies cards via server-owned /api/scan/identify (no client-side
+  LLM keys); unknown cards write to card_submissions for admin review (no
+  user-writable cards INSERT); disambiguation envelope consumed by the client
+  (needsUserSelection no longer silently swallowed).
+skip: []
+status: open
+created: 2026-05-27
+depends_on:
+  - secure-scanner-gemini-key
+---
+
+# Convoy: server-side-scan-pipeline
+
+Move card identification entirely server-side, stop users from INSERTing
+into the global `cards` catalog, and surface disambiguation when OCR is
+ambiguous.
+
+## Why
+
+After convoy #1 closes the key leak, the scanner still runs Gemini Vision
+in the browser via `lib/ai-ocr.js`. That architecture cannot be secured:
+any client-side LLM call requires credentials in JS bundle or runtime fetches.
+Additionally, `pages/api/cards/find-or-create.js` lets authenticated users
+INSERT new rows into the global `cards` table — polluting the shared catalog
+with OCR garbage. The audit also found that `CameraScanner.js` silently
+swallows `needsUserSelection: true` from the identify response, forcing
+wrong-card adds without user confirmation.
+
+## Scope
+
+### In scope
+
+- **Migration** under `migrations/` (via `npm run migrate create`):
+  - `card_submissions` — id, user_id, ocr_text, ocr_confidence,
+    scan_image_url, candidate_card_ids, status, reviewed_by, created_at.
+  - `scan_attempts` — per audit § 5.2 (layer, outcome, timing fields).
+  - Update `docs/SCHEMA_MAP.md`.
+- **`pages/api/scan/identify.js`** (new) — auth +
+  `checkScanRateLimit(req, user.userId)` + server-side Gemini Flash via
+  `process.env.GEMINI_AI_API_KEY`; returns match / disambiguation /
+  unknown envelope.
+- **`pages/api/cards/find-or-create.js`** — delete the user-writable
+  INSERT path; unknown cards write to `card_submissions` instead.
+- **`lib/ai-ocr.js`** — delete browser classes: `GeminiVisionOCR`,
+  `AICardOCR`, `OllamaVisionOCR`, `PuterVisionOCR`. Keep any shared
+  utilities the server route needs (architect decides split).
+- **`components/CameraScanner.js`** — rewrite `processConfirmedCard` to
+  call `/api/scan/identify`; render disambiguation UI when
+  `needsUserSelection: true`.
+- **`pages/scanner.js`** — wire queue + error states to new API contract.
+- **`pages/admin/card-submissions.js`** (new) — admin review queue;
+  promote-to-`cards` action.
+- **`pages/api/admin/card-submissions/**`** (new) — list, approve, reject.
+- **`.cursor/rules/api-routes.mdc`** § Rate limiting — document `scan` class
+  if not fully done in #1.
+- **Extend `forbidden-client-side-llm-keys`** — also fail if
+  `import.*ai-ocr` appears in `components/` (browser classes deleted).
+
+### Out of scope
+
+- **Tesseract / pg_trgm Layer-1 OCR** — convoy `add-real-ocr-layer` (#3).
+- **Stack-destination UX, condition/foil/quantity** — convoy
+  `redesign-scanner-flow` (#4).
+- **OpenCV perspective transform** — queued as
+  `improve-scan-card-detection` if Layer-1 hit rate stays below 70%.
+- **Schema cleanup** (`cards.quantity`, dual visibility flags) — see
+  `schema-cleanup-from-scanner-audit` stub in `.convoys/ship-readiness.md`.
+
+## Roles invoked
+
+1. `role-ia-architect` — admin review queue IA, disambiguation flow labels.
+2. `role-ux-reviewer` — disambiguation picker UX, error/loading states.
+3. `role-architect` — API contract, migration shape, brief decomposition.
+4. `role-implementer` — 4 briefs (2 parallel at gate 1).
+5. `role-reviewer` + `role-design-system-auditor` + `role-a11y-auditor` —
+   post-PR audit fan-out.
+
+## Todos
+
+- [ ] IA: admin card-submissions queue information architecture
+- [ ] UX: disambiguation picker + scanner error states
+- [ ] Architect: ratify Decisions 1–5; write 4 briefs + `slice_dependencies`
+- [ ] Brief 1 — migration + SCHEMA_MAP
+- [ ] Brief 2 — `/api/scan/identify` server route
+- [ ] Brief 3 — client disambiguation + delete browser LLM classes (after Brief 2)
+- [ ] Brief 4 — admin queue + replace find-or-create INSERT (after Briefs 1+2)
+- [ ] Extend CI gate to forbid `import.*ai-ocr` in `components/`
+
+## Operator action required
+
+**None beyond #1.** Assumes `GEMINI_AI_API_KEY` is already rotated and
+only present server-side. Confirm Vercel env var is set before testing
+`/api/scan/identify` on preview.
+
+## Multitask dispatch
+
+### Slice dependencies (multitask-ready)
+
+```yaml
+slice_dependencies:
+  - brief: 1
+    depends_on: []
+    files:
+      - migrations/*
+      - docs/SCHEMA_MAP.md
+  - brief: 2
+    depends_on: []
+    files:
+      - pages/api/scan/**
+  - brief: 3
+    depends_on: [2]
+    files:
+      - components/CameraScanner.js
+      - lib/ai-ocr.js
+      - pages/scanner.js
+  - brief: 4
+    depends_on: [1, 2]
+    files:
+      - pages/api/cards/find-or-create.js
+      - pages/admin/card-submissions.js
+      - pages/api/admin/card-submissions/**
+```
+
+**Gate 1:** `/multitask role-implementer briefs 1, 2` (disjoint files).
+
+**Gate 2:** Brief 3 after Brief 2 merges; Brief 4 after Briefs 1+2 merge
+(Briefs 3 and 4 can run sequentially or Brief 4 parallel with Brief 3 if
+Brief 2 is merged — file sets are disjoint between 3 and 4).
+
+Post-PR audit fan-out:
+
+```
+/multitask role-reviewer + role-design-system-auditor + role-a11y-auditor
+```
+
+Group id: `audit-server-side-scan-pipeline-<pr>`.
+
+**Cross-convoy (after Brief 1 + Brief 2 merge):** `/multitask` **#3 Brief 1
++ #4 Brief 1** — disjoint (DB+route / UX restructure).
+
+## CI impact
+
+| Workflow / job | Behavior |
+| --- | --- |
+| `forbidden-client-side-llm-keys` | **Extended** — grep for `import.*ai-ocr` in `components/`. |
+| `ci.yml` → lint, vitest, schema-map-fresh | Fires on migration + SCHEMA_MAP changes. |
+| `preview-smoke.yml` | Fires; scanner not in smoke spec today. |
+| `visual-diff.yml` | **Fires** — touches `pages/scanner.js`, `pages/admin/**`, `components/CameraScanner.js`. `continue-on-error: true` until baselines seeded. |
+
+## Decisions to ratify (architect)
+
+1. **`/api/scan/identify` request shape.** Image as base64 in JSON vs.
+   multipart vs. Blob URL reference? Parent recommends base64 for v1
+   (matches current canvas capture); architect confirms payload size
+   limits + Vercel function timeout budget.
+
+2. **Disambiguation response envelope.** Verbatim fields:
+   `{ needsUserSelection, candidates: [{ id, name, set, score }], … }`.
+   Architect locks the contract before Brief 2 ships.
+
+3. **`card_submissions.status` enum.** Recommend:
+   `pending | approved | rejected`. Promotion copies vetted row into
+   `cards` with admin attribution.
+
+4. **What happens to `find-or-create` callers?** Inventory all fetch sites;
+   migrate to `/api/scan/identify` + submissions path. Architect lists
+   in brief.
+
+5. **Gemini model + prompt ownership.** Server-side only; single module
+   (extend existing server helper or new `lib/scan-identify.js`).
+
+## Known constraints
+
+- **`checkScanRateLimit` gate-ordering** — MUST sit AFTER
+  `getUserFromRequest` per `.convoys/add-rate-limiting.md` Decision 4
+  (`extractUserIdentifier` THROWS without userId).
+- **`GEMINI_AI_API_KEY` server-only** — never returned in JSON; never
+  logged. CI gate from #1 is the regression lock.
+- **No user INSERT into `cards`** — any path that let non-admins create
+  catalog rows must be removed or admin-gated.
+- **Historical `scripts/add-*`** — no-go-zone; schema via `migrations/` only.
+- **Card-import rate limits unchanged** — import routes stay admin-only;
+  scan limiter is a separate class.
+
+## Acceptance criteria
+
+1. Zero client-side references to `GEMINI_AI_API_KEY`, `apiKey:`, or
+   direct `generativelanguage.googleapis.com` calls outside `pages/api/`.
+2. `GET/POST /api/scan/identify` requires auth; returns 401 without
+   token; returns 429 when scan limit exceeded.
+3. Authenticated scan of unknown card creates `card_submissions` row, NOT
+   a `cards` row.
+4. Disambiguation UI renders when API returns `needsUserSelection: true`;
+   user must pick before card enters queue.
+5. Admin can list + approve/reject submissions at `/admin/card-submissions`.
+6. Approve action promotes to `cards` with audit trail (`reviewed_by`).
+7. `forbidden-client-side-llm-keys` CI job green including `components/`
+   ai-ocr import check.
+8. `npm run lint` baseline preserved; `npm run test:run` 21/21 green.
+9. `docs/SCHEMA_MAP.md` updated for new tables.
+
+## Out of scope follow-ups
+
+- **`add-real-ocr-layer`** (#3) — Tesseract + pg_trgm before Gemini.
+- **`redesign-scanner-flow`** (#4) — destination stack, condition/foil.
+- **`improve-scan-card-detection`** — OpenCV perspective if Layer-1 < 70%.
+- **`fill-vitest-handler-coverage`** — per-route handler tests deferred.
+- **`schema-cleanup-from-scanner-audit`** — global catalog column smells.

.convoys/ship-readiness.md

@@ -484,6 +484,53 @@ Follow-ups surfaced mid-convoy or mid-PR that didn't fit the original launch seq
 - **`audit-node-pg-migrate-transitive-deps`** (priority: P3 hygiene). Surfaced 2026-05-26 by `migration-tool` (PR #32) — R5 in the convoy file. `npm audit` reports 11 vulnerabilities (6 moderate, 5 high) coming from `node-pg-migrate@8.0.4`'s `glob@~11.1.0` + `yargs@~17.7.0` transitive deps (older `brace-expansion`, `minimatch`, `picomatch` versions with known advisories). All in dev-only paths; the migration tool runs in scripts/CI, never in the deployed Next.js bundle, and the affected APIs (glob's shell-injection CLI; brace-expansion's ReDoS) are not exercised by node-pg-migrate's call sites. Surface only if a security audit specifically flags this surface, or if `node-pg-migrate` ships a v9 that updates the transitive tree.
 - **`add-migration-template`** (priority: P3 DX). Surfaced 2026-05-26 by `migration-tool` (PR #32). Add a custom template via `--template-file-name` so generated migrations include the project's preferred docstring shape + a reminder about `docs/SCHEMA_MAP.md` updates. Surface if migration authoring proves inconsistent.
 
+### Scanner audit portfolio (2026-05-27)
+
+Six convoys authored from the scanner audit portfolio plan. Dependency order:
+`secure-scanner-gemini-key` → `server-side-scan-pipeline` → (`add-real-ocr-layer` ∥
+`redesign-scanner-flow`); `rename-collections-vocabulary` and
+`scanner-correctness-polish` parallel after #1.
+
+- **`secure-scanner-gemini-key`** (priority: **P0 security** — ships first).
+  Delete `pages/api/config/gemini.js`; remove CameraScanner client key auto-load;
+  add sixth `scan` rate-limit class; new `forbidden-client-side-llm-keys` CI gate.
+  **Operator action:** rotate `GEMINI_AI_API_KEY` in Google AI Studio + Vercel
+  before merge. Convoy: `.convoys/secure-scanner-gemini-key.md`.
+- **`server-side-scan-pipeline`** (priority: P1 feature;
+  `depends_on: secure-scanner-gemini-key`). Server-owned `/api/scan/identify`;
+  `card_submissions` + `scan_attempts` tables; remove user-writable `cards`
+  INSERT; admin review queue; client disambiguation UI. Four briefs; gate-1
+  `/multitask` briefs 1+2. Convoy: `.convoys/server-side-scan-pipeline.md`.
+- **`add-real-ocr-layer`** (priority: P1 feature;
+  `depends_on: server-side-scan-pipeline`). Tesseract Worker + `pg_trgm`
+  identify-by-text route; ≥70% Layer-1 hit rate via `scan_attempts.layer`.
+  Piggybacks `schema-map-fresh` CI path fix for `migrations/`. Convoy:
+  `.convoys/add-real-ocr-layer.md`.
+- **`redesign-scanner-flow`** (priority: P1 feature;
+  `depends_on: server-side-scan-pipeline`). Stack-destination UX,
+  condition/foil/quantity, ownership badge, Blob scan-image persistence. Three
+  briefs; `/multitask` briefs 2+3 after brief 1. Can run parallel with
+  `add-real-ocr-layer`. Convoy: `.convoys/redesign-scanner-flow.md`.
+- **`rename-collections-vocabulary`** (priority: P2 IA/copy; parallel to #1+#2).
+  "My Collection" / "Lists" / "Binders" copy sweep; `forbidden-stale-strings`
+  CI gate; `AGENTS.md` vocabulary table. Skips architect (`skip: arch`); IA +
+  UX run. Convoy: `.convoys/rename-collections-vocabulary.md`.
+- **`scanner-correctness-polish`** (priority: P2 infra; parallel to #1+#2).
+  Idempotent Mark-Owned, fix bulk `setTimeout` race, `lib/use-auth` import,
+  `logCollectionActivity` on collection card POST. Single brief. Convoy:
+  `.convoys/scanner-correctness-polish.md`.
+- **`schema-cleanup-from-scanner-audit`** (priority: P2 schema; **deferred** —
+  NOT scanner-specific). Separate convoy when ready; surfaced by the scanner
+  audit but applies globally:
+  1. **`cards.quantity` + `cards.favorited`** on the global catalog — belong on
+     `user_cards` / `user_favorites`; drop from `cards`.
+  2. **`collections.is_public` vs `visibility`** — dual visibility flags;
+     reconcile to one mechanism (see also P2 §14 in this file).
+  3. **`is_system_collection` vs `user_cards` unification** — ownership model
+     smell; IA + schema convoy, not a scanner deliverable.
+  Do not fold into the six scanner convoys above; queue as its own architect-led
+  migration convoy after the scan pipeline stabilizes.
+
 ## Self-analytics
 
 After each convoy, `scripts/log-convoy-event.sh` emits a record to `.convoys/.metrics.jsonl` (gitignored). After 3-5 convoys, run the upstream `agent-pipeline/analytics/` aggregator to see where token spend goes — that data feeds whether to add or remove rules.

.cursor/rules/api-routes.mdc

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ await logCollectionActivity(collectionId, userId, 'card_added', { cardId, quanti
 
 ## Rate limiting
 
-`lib/rate-limit.js` exposes five named limiters, one per route class. Each named export takes `req` (and `userId` for user-keyed classes) and returns `{ allowed, remaining, reset }`. The auth-only limiter shipped in `fix-auth-bypass` Brief 4 (commit `297afca`, login + register); the four remaining classes — `search`, `upload`, `generate`, `import` — and the seven currently-gated routes shipped in `add-rate-limiting` (squash commit `708ef45`, PR #20, 2026-05-24), the convoy that closed P0 #6 and brought the launch-readiness P0 set to 8/8 RESOLVED. The five Redis key prefixes were renamed `tcgvault:*` → `deckhearth:*` in `pick-a-name` (squash commit `9abbab6`, PR #21, 2026-05-24) — call shape, return shape, and gate-ordering rules below are byte-identical post-rename; only the on-Redis namespace changed (one-time per-window counter reset accepted).
+`lib/rate-limit.js` exposes six named limiters, one per route class. Each named export takes `req` (and `userId` for user-keyed classes) and returns `{ allowed, remaining, reset }`. The auth-only limiter shipped in `fix-auth-bypass` Brief 4 (commit `297afca`, login + register); the four remaining classes — `search`, `upload`, `generate`, `import` — and the seven currently-gated routes shipped in `add-rate-limiting` (squash commit `708ef45`, PR #20, 2026-05-24), the convoy that closed P0 #6 and brought the launch-readiness P0 set to 8/8 RESOLVED. The `scan` class shipped in `secure-scanner-gemini-key` (2026-05-27) for `/api/scan/identify` (wired in `server-side-scan-pipeline`). The six Redis key prefixes were renamed `tcgvault:*` → `deckhearth:*` in `pick-a-name` (squash commit `9abbab6`, PR #21, 2026-05-24) — call shape, return shape, and gate-ordering rules below are byte-identical post-rename; only the on-Redis namespace changed (one-time per-window counter reset accepted).
 
 | Class | Limit | Window | Key | Used by | Helper |
 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
@@ -112,8 +112,9 @@ await logCollectionActivity(collectionId, userId, 'card_added', { cardId, quanti
 | `upload` | 10 | 1 hour | user | `/api/user/avatar` | `checkUploadRateLimit(req, userId)` |
 | `generate` | 5 | 1 hour | user | `/api/user/avatar/generate` | `checkGenerateRateLimit(req, userId)` |
 | `import` | 5 | 1 hour | user | `/api/cards/import-mtg`, `/api/cards/import-pokemon`, `/api/cards/import-lorcana` | `checkImportRateLimit(req, userId)` |
+| `scan` | 5 | 1 min | user | `/api/scan/identify` | `checkScanRateLimit(req, userId)` |
 
-**Verbatim call shape** (identical across all five classes — only the helper name and the optional `userId` argument differ):
+**Verbatim call shape** (identical across all six classes — only the helper name and the optional `userId` argument differ):
 
 ```js
 import { checkSearchRateLimit } from '../../../lib/rate-limit.js';
@@ -142,7 +143,7 @@ export default async function handler(req, res) {
 **Gate ordering rules:**
 
 1. **Method check first.** Reject the wrong verb with 405 before doing any limiter work.
-2. **Auth check before any user-keyed limiter.** `extractUserIdentifier(userId)` THROWS when `userId` is null/undefined/empty (defensive). For `upload`, `generate`, and `import`, the handler MUST call `getUserFromRequest(req)` (or equivalent JWT verification) and confirm a non-null user BEFORE calling the limiter. Wrong order = anonymous user bypasses (the THROW surfaces immediately during dev; do not catch and silently fall back to IP).
+2. **Auth check before any user-keyed limiter.** `extractUserIdentifier(userId)` THROWS when `userId` is null/undefined/empty (defensive). For `upload`, `generate`, `import`, and `scan`, the handler MUST call `getUserFromRequest(req)` (or equivalent JWT verification) and confirm a non-null user BEFORE calling the limiter. Wrong order = anonymous user bypasses (the THROW surfaces immediately during dev; do not catch and silently fall back to IP).
 3. **For IP-keyed limiters (`auth`, `search`), gate placement is flexible** — either at the top of the handler (after the method check) or after a separate auth check that the route happens to also have (e.g. `users/search` JWT-verifies before rate-limiting, both are correct). The limiter only needs `req` for IP extraction.
 4. **Admin-role check, if applicable, goes between auth and rate-limit.** Used by all three `/api/cards/import-*` routes: `if (user.role !== 'admin') return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Admin access required' })` sits between the `if (!user)` 401 and the import rate-limit call.
 
@@ -153,7 +154,7 @@ export default async function handler(req, res) {
 
 **Env vars (unchanged from Brief 4):** `KV_REST_API_URL` + `KV_REST_API_TOKEN` (auto-provisioned by Vercel's Upstash Marketplace integration). In prod, missing either var is a **fail-closed throw** on the first call. In dev / test, the module warn-and-no-ops so local work isn't blocked. See `AGENTS.md` Gotcha #12 for the full env-var contract.
 
-**429 response shape is uniform across all five classes.** Same error message (`'Too many attempts. Try again later.'`) and same `Retry-After` header calculation. Per-class variation would fingerprint the limits to an attacker.
+**429 response shape is uniform across all six classes.** Same error message (`'Too many attempts. Try again later.'`) and same `Retry-After` header calculation. Per-class variation would fingerprint the limits to an attacker.
 
 **Fail-open on Upstash outage.** A network failure inside `ratelimit.limit(...)` returns `{ allowed: true, remaining: Infinity, reset: 0 }` with a single `console.error('[rate-limit]', err)`. Reasoning: a hard Upstash outage should not lock the entire user base out of every gated route. Brute-force / abuse protection lives behind defense-in-depth (Vercel firewall, future fail2ban-style lockout).
 

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -142,6 +142,59 @@ jobs:
           fi
           echo "OK: no Access-Control-Allow-* headers under pages/api/."
 
+  forbidden-client-side-llm-keys:
+    name: No client-side LLM key leakage
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - name: Fail on key-returning config endpoints or new browser LLM URLs
+        run: |
+          # Deleted by secure-scanner-gemini-key — must not return API keys to browsers.
+          if [ -f pages/api/config/gemini.js ]; then
+            echo "::error file=pages/api/config/gemini.js::Forbidden config endpoint — do not return API keys to browsers."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          CONFIG_MATCHES=$(grep -rEn 'apiKey:' pages/api/config/ 2>/dev/null || true)
+          if [ -n "$CONFIG_MATCHES" ]; then
+            echo "::error::Forbidden apiKey response under pages/api/config/."
+            echo "$CONFIG_MATCHES" | while IFS= read -r line; do
+              file=$(echo "$line" | cut -d: -f1)
+              lineno=$(echo "$line" | cut -d: -f2)
+              echo "::error file=${file},line=${lineno}::Do not return API keys from config endpoints."
+            done
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          # Grandfathered until server-side-scan-pipeline (#2) removes browser LLM clients.
+          GRANDFATHER=(
+            lib/ai-ocr.js
+            components/OCRSettings.js
+          )
+          LLM_PATTERN='generativelanguage\.googleapis\.com|api\.openai\.com'
+          FOUND=()
+          while IFS= read -r file; do
+            skip=false
+            for gf in "${GRANDFATHER[@]}"; do
+              if [ "$file" = "$gf" ]; then
+                skip=true
+                break
+              fi
+            done
+            if [ "$skip" = true ]; then
+              continue
+            fi
+            if grep -qE "$LLM_PATTERN" "$file" 2>/dev/null; then
+              FOUND+=("$file")
+            fi
+          done < <(find components lib pages -name '*.js' ! -path 'pages/api/*' 2>/dev/null || true)
+          if [ ${#FOUND[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
+            echo "::error::Client-side LLM API URLs must not appear outside pages/api/ (except grandfathered files pending server-side-scan-pipeline)."
+            for path in "${FOUND[@]}"; do
+              echo "::error file=${path}::Move LLM calls server-side or add to server-side-scan-pipeline removal list."
+            done
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          echo "OK: no client-side LLM key leakage patterns detected."
+
   test:
     name: Unit tests (vitest)
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest

components/CameraScanner.js

@@ -29,9 +29,8 @@ export default function CameraScanner({ onCardScanned, onError }) {
   // Mana symbol settings
   const [manaSymbolSettings, setManaSymbolSettings] = useState({ useSVG: false });
 
-  // Load OCR settings and auto-configure Gemini
+  // Load OCR settings from localStorage only (never fetch server-side API keys)
   useEffect(() => {
-    const loadOcrSettings = async () => {
     let settings = {
       service: 'gemini',
       openaiApiKey: '',
@@ -49,26 +48,8 @@ export default function CameraScanner({ onCardScanned, onError }) {
       }
     }
 
-      // Auto-load Gemini API key from environment
-      if (!settings.geminiApiKey) {
-        try {
-          const response = await fetch('/api/config/gemini');
-          if (response.ok) {
-            const data = await response.json();
-            if (data.hasKey && data.apiKey) {
-              settings.geminiApiKey = data.apiKey;
-              settings.service = 'gemini';
-              console.log('✅ Auto-configured Gemini API key from environment');
-            }
-          }
-        } catch (error) {
-          console.log('Could not auto-load Gemini API key:', error);
-        }
-      }
-
     setOcrSettings(settings);
 
-      // Configure AI services
     if (settings.openaiApiKey) {
       aiCardOCR.setApiKey(settings.openaiApiKey);
     }
@@ -78,9 +59,6 @@ export default function CameraScanner({ onCardScanned, onError }) {
     if (settings.ollamaUrl) {
       ollamaCardOCR.setBaseUrl(settings.ollamaUrl);
     }
-    };
-
-    loadOcrSettings();
   }, []);
 
   // Configure canvas contexts for optimal performance

components/OCRSettings.js

@@ -11,9 +11,8 @@ export default function OCRSettings({ isOpen, onClose }) {
   const [isTesting, setIsTesting] = useState(false);
   const [testResult, setTestResult] = useState(null);
 
-  // Load settings from localStorage on mount
+  // Load settings from localStorage on mount (never fetch server-side API keys)
   useEffect(() => {
-    const loadSettings = async () => {
     const savedSettings = localStorage.getItem('ocrSettings');
     let currentSettings = {
       service: 'gemini',
@@ -31,26 +30,7 @@ export default function OCRSettings({ isOpen, onClose }) {
       }
     }
 
-      // Try to auto-load Gemini API key from environment if not already set
-      if (!currentSettings.geminiApiKey) {
-        try {
-          const response = await fetch('/api/config/gemini');
-          if (response.ok) {
-            const data = await response.json();
-            if (data.hasKey && data.apiKey) {
-              currentSettings.geminiApiKey = data.apiKey;
-              currentSettings.service = 'gemini'; // Default to Gemini if key is available
-            }
-          }
-        } catch (error) {
-          console.log('Could not auto-load Gemini API key:', error);
-        }
-      }
-
     setSettings(currentSettings);
-    };
-
-    loadSettings();
   }, []);
 
   const saveSettings = () => {

lib/rate-limit.js

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ const LIMITER_CONFIG = {
   upload:   { limit: 10, window: '1 h',  prefix: 'deckhearth:upload' },
   generate: { limit: 5,  window: '1 h',  prefix: 'deckhearth:generate' },
   import:   { limit: 5,  window: '1 h',  prefix: 'deckhearth:import' },
+  scan:     { limit: 5,  window: '1 m',  prefix: 'deckhearth:scan' },
 };
 
 // Lazy singleton. Module-load init would throw in environments without
@@ -129,3 +130,7 @@ export async function checkGenerateRateLimit(req, userId) {
 export async function checkImportRateLimit(req, userId) {
   return check('import', extractUserIdentifier(userId));
 }
+
+export async function checkScanRateLimit(req, userId) {
+  return check('scan', extractUserIdentifier(userId));
+}

pages/api/config/gemini.js

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-export default async function handler(req, res) {
-  if (req.method !== 'GET') {
-    return res.status(405).json({ error: 'Method not allowed' });
-  }
-
-  try {
-    // Get Gemini API key from environment
-    const geminiApiKey = process.env.GEMINI_AI_API_KEY;
-    
-    if (geminiApiKey) {
-      return res.status(200).json({ 
-        hasKey: true,
-        apiKey: geminiApiKey 
-      });
-    } else {
-      return res.status(200).json({ 
-        hasKey: false,
-        message: 'No Gemini API key found in environment' 
-      });
-    }
-  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('Error getting Gemini config:', error);
-    return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal server error' });
-  }
-}