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varutasu
9a3e077d40
fix(ci): plumb VERCEL_AUTOMATION_BYPASS_SECRET into preview-smoke + visual-diff (#17)
* architect: plan fix-vercel-deployment-protection-in-ci convoy (1 brief)

Flip convoy status queued -> in-progress and append the architect
output per the role-architect contract:

- Decisions (post-IA round) A/B/C/D with recommendations + rationale,
  routed back to operator for gate-1 ratification (A and D especially).
- Architecture section: file plan, risk list (R1-R8), test plan,
  decomposition (1 brief, justified), slice_dependencies block.
- brief-1: inject VERCEL_AUTOMATION_BYPASS_SECRET into both workflows
  via query-param-on-path (Decision A), tighten max_timeout 600 -> 120
  (Decision B), extend gate to skip fork PRs (Decision D), and forward
  the secret as an env var to the Playwright/visual step for forward-
  compat with adopt-playwright-smoke.

Boot-the-brief findings preempted in the brief:
- wait-for-vercel-preview@v1.3.2 source confirms only `targetUrl` (the
  bare deployment URL) is ever logged or emitted as outputs.url; the
  bypass query in `path:` is structurally invisible to logs and to
  downstream consumers of ${{ steps.vercel.outputs.url }}.
- The action exposes no custom-header input -- Option B is mechanically
  impossible for the wait step without forking the action.
- `path:` MUST begin with a leading `/` because the action parses it
  via `new URL(path, url)`.
- PR #16 run logs confirm the 401 timeout failure mode the convoy targets.
- Playwright config doesn't exist yet (adopt-playwright-smoke owns it);
  this brief only plumbs the env var.

No workflow YAML, no Playwright config, no AGENTS.md changes in this
commit -- those land in the implementer phase per the architect contract.

Awaiting human gate 1 (Decisions A + B + D ratification + brief approval)
before implementer dispatch.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(ci): plumb VERCEL_AUTOMATION_BYPASS_SECRET into preview-smoke + visual-diff (Brief 1 of fix-vercel-deployment-protection-in-ci)

Closes the CI-infra half of P0 #7's follow-up. PR #16 (squash commit
7e97254) added scoped permissions to both workflows but exposed that
Vercel Deployment Protection 401s anonymous GitHub-runner requests,
causing both Playwright smoke and Screenshot diff to time out at 10
minutes on every PR. This brief plumbs the bypass secret end-to-end
so the wait-action's healthcheck reaches 200.

Per architect Decision A (.convoys/fix-vercel-deployment-protection-in-ci.md):
- preview-smoke.yml + visual-diff.yml: wait-for-vercel-preview's
  `path:` input now carries the bypass as a query parameter
  `?x-vercel-protection-bypass=${{ secrets.* }}&x-vercel-set-bypass-cookie=true`.
  The action only logs the bare targetUrl (verified in action.js:357,360,363)
  so the secret stays out of workflow logs.

Per Decision B:
- max_timeout: 600 -> 120. PR #16 evidence shows Vercel previews are up
  within seconds of job start; 120s gives ample headroom and surfaces
  misconfigurations in ~2 minutes instead of ~10.

Per Decision D (NEW -- surfaced by Boot-the-brief):
- gate: job's Decide step now checks github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork
  FIRST. Forks lack repo secrets, so they would otherwise burn ~4 minutes
  per PR on a misleading 401. The fork-check emits `::notice::` and short-
  circuits before the existing skip-via-PR-body directive runs.

Forward-compat for adopt-playwright-smoke:
- Both workflows' Playwright/screenshot-capture step now exports
  VERCEL_AUTOMATION_BYPASS_SECRET as env. The actual Playwright config
  consumes it via extraHTTPHeaders in adopt-playwright-smoke's brief.
  BASE_URL stays as the bare \${{ steps.vercel.outputs.url }} (no query
  string) so it remains safe to echo.

Verification:
- YAML parses (js-yaml load on both files: preview-smoke jobs [gate, smoke];
  visual-diff jobs [gate, visual])
- actionlint not run (binary not installed locally); recommend installing
  for future PRs. Future adopt-actionlint convoy could add it to CI.
- No `set -x`, `echo`, `cat`, or `printf` of the secret or bypass URL
  in any modified step
- permissions: and concurrency: blocks unchanged (PR #16 contracts preserved)

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(ci): route github.event.pull_request.body through env: to avoid shell injection

Pre-existing latent bug surfaced by PR #17's CI run. The Decide step's
inline `${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}` interpolation pastes
arbitrary PR-body text directly into a bash script. When the body
contains shell metacharacters (parens, pipes, backticks, redirections,
etc.) the resulting script either errors out at YAML-load time OR —
worse — executes attacker-controlled shell.

This bit PR #17 with a real syntax error ("unexpected token `('")
because the PR body contains parenthesized phrases like
"(was: 10-minute timeout)". Every Decide-step run in this repo has
been one badly-formatted PR body away from breaking the gate.

Fix: forward `github.event.pull_request.body` and
`github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork` through the step's `env:`
block as `PR_BODY` and `PR_IS_FORK`, then quote them in shell
(`"$PR_BODY"`, `"$PR_IS_FORK"`). The env-var path leaves the values
as plain strings rather than syntactically embedded code, which is the
standard GitHub Actions hardening pattern (see GitHub's "Security
hardening for GitHub Actions" → "Using a third-party action").

Same change in both workflows; ~9 LOC each.

This fix is technically beyond Brief 1's scope (which targeted only
Vercel-bypass plumbing) but is added in this convoy because the bug
actively blocks Brief 1's success criterion from being validated on
PR #17. Documented in the convoy file's "Anything flagged but not
acted on" follow-up pass.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* fix(ci): drop x-vercel-set-bypass-cookie=true from wait-action path

The wait-action's healthcheck was still 401ing despite the bypass query
being correct. Root cause: with `x-vercel-set-bypass-cookie=true`, Vercel
returns 307 + Set-Cookie (`_vercel_jwt`), but axios in Node has no cookie
jar — it follows the redirect to the bare URL without the cookie, which
then 401s.

Local verification (run by operator):
  curl -sI "https://<preview>/?x-vercel-protection-bypass=<secret>" | head -1
  → HTTP/2 200   (works, no cookie needed)

  curl -sI "https://<preview>/?x-vercel-protection-bypass=<secret>&x-vercel-set-bypass-cookie=true" | head -1
  → HTTP/2 307   (the redirect-without-cookie path that breaks axios)

For a one-shot healthcheck, the per-request bypass query is enough.
The cookie variant stays reserved for the future Playwright config
(adopt-playwright-smoke) where a real browser cookie jar exists.

Added an inline comment in preview-smoke.yml explaining this so the
next agent doesn't accidentally re-add the cookie param.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-05-24 16:26:22 -05:00