From cd4ba3535692baea632d773714d87e48dfafba42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randall Stillwell Date: Sat, 23 May 2026 12:32:52 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] architect(drop-public-setup): plan + brief 1 (env-var admin password) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Single-brief convoy. ~25 LOC net across 2 files (scripts/setup-neon-db.js, README.md). No fan-out; single PR. Decisions: A1 — going-forward only (matches JWT_SECRET pattern from fix-auth-bypass Brief 1). Existing weak-hash admin rows in deployed envs are NOT rotated; operators rotate manually via the app after merge. Queue rotate-default-admin follow-up if a real audit finds a deploy still on the weak hash. B — operational change to setup-neon-db.js is allowed; no-go-zones rule prohibits SCHEMA edits, not env-var gating. C1 — no vitest coverage. Fail-loud path is validated by manual smoke (the brief mandates pasting fail-loud + happy-path output into the PR description). Key risks tracked: R1 (existing weak hash), R2 (unhelpful error), R3 (stdout password leak — delete the console.log lines, do NOT interpolate the env-var), R4 (silent rotation if ON CONFLICT changed to DO UPDATE), R5 (README env block omits the new var), R6 (3 sibling files still have admin123 — out of scope per convoy spec). Flagged-but-deferred: - CommonJS in ESM package (setup-neon-db.js) → convert-setup-db-to-esm - admin123 in reset-db.js, create-test-users.js, TESTING_GUIDE.md → purge-weak-creds-from-helpers (or fold into launch-polish) - admin@tcgvault.com hardcoded email → pick-a-name convoy addresses: P0 #3 from .convoys/ship-readiness.md parent: ship-readiness Co-authored-by: Cursor --- .convoys/drop-public-setup.md | 82 +++++++++ .../brief-1-env-var-admin-password.md | 167 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 249 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .convoys/drop-public-setup/brief-1-env-var-admin-password.md diff --git a/.convoys/drop-public-setup.md b/.convoys/drop-public-setup.md index 16638f8..e06642e 100644 --- a/.convoys/drop-public-setup.md +++ b/.convoys/drop-public-setup.md @@ -86,3 +86,85 @@ the README. 1-2 briefs, ~3 files total, no UI, no API surface, no migration. Should ship as a single PR (no fan-out). + +## Architecture + +Architect: `role-architect`. Date: 2026-05-23. Convoy decomposed into **1 brief** — the surface is two files (one script, one doc) and the fix is a single coherent change (env-var gate + README rewrite); splitting would force the README update to land first or last on its own, which adds review overhead without any parallelization win. + +### File plan + +| File | Action | Brief | Purpose | +| --- | --- | --- | --- | +| `scripts/setup-neon-db.js` | modified | 1 | Read `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` env var at the top of `setupNeonDatabase()`. If unset or empty string, log a clear actionable error (names the env var, points at `.env.local`, suggests `openssl rand -base64 24`) and `process.exit(1)` **before** any DDL or DB connection. Replace `bcrypt.hash('admin123', 12)` with `bcrypt.hash(adminPassword, 12)`. Remove the trailing `console.log(' Admin User: admin@tcgvault.com')` and `console.log(' Admin Password: admin123')` lines so neither the literal nor the env-var value lands in stdout. Keep `ON CONFLICT (email) DO NOTHING` — see R4. Match the existing CJS `require()` style (the file's top is `#!/usr/bin/env node` + `require('dotenv').config(...)`; do **not** convert to ESM in this brief — that's a separate concern flagged in **Out-of-scope** below). | +| `README.md` | modified | 1 | Strip the "🔐 Default Admin Account" section (lines 115-119) entirely. Add `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` to the install-step env-example block alongside `POSTGRES_URL` / `JWT_SECRET`, with a one-line note that it is required for `npm run setup-db` and can be set as a CI secret instead of `.env.local` if setup runs from CI. Add a short "First-time admin setup" paragraph under or near "Set up the database" that documents the env-var requirement, the `openssl rand -base64 24` tip, and the fact that operators of envs predating this convoy must rotate the admin password manually (Decision A). | + +### API surface + +**No new routes, no modified routes.** This convoy is purely operational — the seed script is a CLI tool (`npm run setup-db`) and `README.md` is documentation. The `/api/setup-database.js` route referenced in the original P0 #3 spec was already deleted by `fix-auth-bypass` Brief 3 (commit `fc0dd73`); CI's `forbidden-endpoints` job blocks reintroduction. + +### Schema diff + +**No schema changes.** No `CREATE TABLE`, no `ALTER`, no `INSERT INTO users` semantic change beyond *which password gets hashed and stored on first run*. Same column shape, same `ON CONFLICT` clause, same `bcrypt` cost factor (12). This is what Decision B turns on — see below. + +### Test plan + +**No vitest coverage added** (Decision C — C1). The setup script runs once per environment; the fail-loud env-var path is verified by **manual smoke** in the brief's acceptance criteria: + +1. **Happy path:** With `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD=` set in `.env.local`, run `npm run setup-db`. Expect the admin row to be created (or skipped if it already exists) and the script to print neither the literal `'admin123'` nor the chosen password value to stdout. Then `curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/auth/login -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"email":"admin@tcgvault.com","password":""}'` returns 200 with a JWT. +2. **Fail-loud path:** Unset `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` (`unset ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` or comment it out in `.env.local`) and run `npm run setup-db`. Expect the script to print the error message and exit with code 1 **before** opening a DB connection. +3. **Idempotency:** With the admin row already present (weak `admin123` hash or otherwise), re-run setup-db with `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD=`. Expect the admin row to be **unchanged** (`ON CONFLICT (email) DO NOTHING` short-circuits the INSERT). This is the documented behavior — rotation is out of scope (Decision A). +4. **README accuracy:** Read README top-to-bottom; confirm no occurrence of `admin123` remains, the new env-example block lists `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD`, and the "First-time admin setup" copy matches the script's actual behavior. + +Implementer pastes the stdout from steps 1 + 2 into the PR description for the reviewer. + +**Why not unit tests** (Decision C rationale): the script is run a handful of times per environment lifetime, the failure modes are loud (`process.exit(1)` + clear stderr), and unit-testing the env-var-required path would require either (a) extracting the admin-creation logic into a new `lib/seed-admin.js` module (scope expansion — Decision C option C3) or (b) spawning `node scripts/setup-neon-db.js` from a `vitest` test and asserting on stdout / exit code (slow, brittle, requires mocking `@neondatabase/serverless`). Manual smoke catches the same regressions at a fraction of the LOC cost, and the brief's acceptance criteria forces the implementer to actually run it. + +### Risk list + +- **R1 — Existing deployed admin rows are unchanged.** Any environment where `scripts/setup-neon-db.js` has already run with the old `bcrypt.hash('admin123', ...)` keeps the weak hash after this convoy merges, because `ON CONFLICT (email) DO NOTHING` skips the INSERT on re-run. **Mitigation:** Decision A (going-forward only). The brief's "Pre-merge operator checklist" and the README's new copy explicitly state that operators of pre-convoy envs must rotate the admin password manually (via the app's password-change UI or a future `rotate-default-admin` follow-up convoy). The PR description must include this callout for reviewers. +- **R2 — Operator runs `npm run setup-db` without setting the env var and the error is unhelpful.** A bare `throw new Error('missing')` would leave a new operator confused. **Mitigation:** the brief mandates a verbatim-near actionable message that names `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD`, points at `.env.local`, suggests `openssl rand -base64 24`, and notes the CI-secret alternative. Matches the wording shape Brief 1 of `fix-auth-bypass` used for `JWT_SECRET` in `lib/auth-secret.js`. +- **R3 — Setup-script stdout leaks the new admin password into CI logs.** The current script prints `Admin User: admin@tcgvault.com` and `Admin Password: admin123` after success. If we leave the second line and interpolate the env-var value into it, the chosen password lands in plaintext stdout — visible to anyone with CI log access, including the Vercel deploy log if setup ever runs there. **Mitigation:** the brief deletes both `console.log` lines outright. The success summary becomes `'✅ Admin user ready (email: admin@tcgvault.com)'` with no password echo. The chosen password is set only in the operator's env-var source (`.env.local` or CI secret), where access control already lives. +- **R4 — Changing `ON CONFLICT (email) DO NOTHING` to `DO UPDATE SET password = ...` would silently rotate every existing dev's admin password to whatever they put in `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD`.** This is **not** what we want; rotation is a separate concern (Decision A). **Mitigation:** the brief explicitly keeps `ON CONFLICT (email) DO NOTHING` unchanged and adds a verbatim acceptance-criterion line forbidding the change. A future `rotate-default-admin` follow-up convoy may add a separate idempotent migration script under `scripts/migrations/YYYY-MM-DD-*.js` if a real audit finds a deploy still carrying the weak hash. +- **R5 — README install-step env block omits the new variable.** A first-time operator following the README copies the env example, runs `npm run setup-db`, and hits the fail-loud error — confusing if the env example didn't mention `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD`. **Mitigation:** the brief explicitly updates the env block in step 3 of the README's installation section, not just the "Default Admin Account" section. +- **R6 — Three sibling files still hardcode `admin@tcgvault.com` / `admin123`.** Out of scope for this convoy (per the convoy spec's "Out of scope" list — these are historical scripts and a manual-QA doc): `scripts/reset-db.js` (lines ~141-156), `scripts/create-test-users.js` (line ~34), `TESTING_GUIDE.md` (line ~7). **Mitigation:** flag as a follow-up under § Anything flagged but not acted on below. The argument for *not* including them here: `reset-db.js` is a no-go-zone (`scripts/fix-*.js` family — historical / already-run), `create-test-users.js` is a dev seed for non-admin alice / bob / carol accounts where the weak admin reference is informational only, and `TESTING_GUIDE.md` is the test-data table for `create-test-users.js`. Sweeping them together would either widen the convoy's scope to "credential hygiene full sweep" or violate no-go-zones. + +### Decomposition + +| Brief # | Title | Files | Depends on | Estimated PR size | +| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | +| 1 | Require `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` env var; strip credentials from README | `scripts/setup-neon-db.js`, `README.md` | — | ~25 LOC net (10 added, 15 removed) | + +### Slice dependencies (multitask-ready) + +```yaml +slice_dependencies: + - brief: 1 + depends_on: [] + files: + - scripts/setup-neon-db.js + - README.md +``` + +No fan-out — one brief, two files, single PR. `/multitask` is not applicable. + +## Decisions + +### Decision A: Existing-admin rotation story → **A1 (going-forward only)** + +We ship the env-var gate alone; rotation of any already-deployed weak `admin123` hash is left to manual operator action, documented in the README and the PR description. **Rationale (3 sentences):** this matches the pattern fix-auth-bypass Brief 1 used for `JWT_SECRET` — fix-loud the input path, do not sweep existing data, and queue any data-sweep work as a separate convoy when an audit demands it. The alternative (a one-time idempotent rotation script under `scripts/migrations/`) is sensible but doubles the brief count and introduces a new env var (`ADMIN_RESET_PASSWORD`) for a problem we cannot confirm exists in any specific deploy. If the queued `pick-a-name` / launch-audit convoys surface a real deploy still using the weak hash, the follow-up convoy `rotate-default-admin` is queued in § Anything flagged but not acted on for that purpose. + +### Decision B: `no-go-zones` reading → **operational change is allowed** + +The no-go-zones rule prohibits editing `scripts/setup-neon-db.js` for **schema changes** (`CREATE TABLE`, `ALTER`, new columns, idempotency-of-DDL concerns). **Rationale (3 sentences):** this convoy's edit is purely operational — it gates one bcrypt input on an env var and adjusts two `console.log` lines, with zero changes to DDL, table definitions, or the `ON CONFLICT` clause. That's structurally equivalent to Brief 1 of fix-auth-bypass, which added env-var fail-loud to `lib/auth-secret.js` without anyone treating it as a schema-rule violation. The brief documents the distinction explicitly in its "Conventions to follow" section so future agents reading either file see the reasoning. + +### Decision C: vitest coverage → **C1 (no tests)** + +The setup script runs a handful of times per environment lifetime; its failure modes are loud (`process.exit(1)` + clear stderr) and immediate; and the manual-smoke acceptance criteria in the brief cover both the happy and fail-loud paths. **Rationale (3 sentences):** unit-testing the env-var path would require either extracting a `lib/seed-admin.js` module (Decision C3 — scope expansion, ~2× brief LOC, plus a new file to maintain) or spawning `node scripts/setup-neon-db.js` from vitest and mocking `@neondatabase/serverless` (slow, fragile, low signal). Following the same heuristic the existing vitest suite uses — "tests cover the runtime auth surface that 30+ handlers depend on, not the operational scripts that run once per env" — leaves the test inventory focused on the highest-blast-radius surfaces. If a future convoy extracts seed logic for any other reason (e.g. multi-env seed templates), it can add tests at that point for free. + +## Anything flagged but not acted on + +These are real findings surfaced during architecture but **deliberately out of scope** for this convoy. Each should be tracked separately so the audit trail survives. + +1. **CommonJS `require()` in an ESM package (`scripts/setup-neon-db.js`).** The repo's `package.json` has `"type": "module"` (since the `bump-next-js` convoy), but this script still uses `require('dotenv')` / `require('@neondatabase/serverless')` at the top. It runs successfully today under Node 22 — `node scripts/setup-neon-db.js` executes the file; `require()` interop appears to be working — but this is a fragile state and could break on a future Node minor or under stricter loader semantics. **Why not fixed here:** the convoy's stated scope is the env-var gate + README, and converting CJS → ESM in the same brief would (a) widen the diff beyond the 25-LOC estimate, (b) require also adjusting the inline `require('bcryptjs')` plus the dotenv loader pattern, and (c) is a separate concern that should land on its own so the diff is reviewable in isolation. **Follow-up suggestion:** queue a tiny `convert-setup-db-to-esm` convoy if anyone runs into a Node-loader regression, or fold it into the queued `migration-tool` convoy when that lands and rewrites the seed surface anyway. +2. **Sibling weak-credential references in `scripts/reset-db.js`, `scripts/create-test-users.js`, and `TESTING_GUIDE.md`.** `reset-db.js` mirrors `setup-neon-db.js`'s admin-INSERT and password echo (lines ~141-156); `create-test-users.js` prints `admin@tcgvault.com / admin123 (Admin)` as a usage hint (line ~34); `TESTING_GUIDE.md` has the same row in its test-account table (line ~7). **Why not fixed here:** the convoy spec's "Out of scope" list explicitly excludes "any other `scripts/seed-*.js` or `scripts/add-*.js` files (those are one-off historical jobs per no-go-zones)", and `reset-db.js` is in the `scripts/fix-*` / historical family. `TESTING_GUIDE.md` is the manual-QA doc that doc-writer is expected to rename to `docs/MANUAL_QA.md` in the launch-polish convoy (P3, ship-readiness § Role-doc-writer findings) — folding it in here adds review overhead. **Follow-up suggestion:** queue a small `purge-weak-creds-from-helpers` convoy as part of the launch-polish phase, or roll it into `pick-a-name` (since the email itself is also changing). +3. **The success-summary `console.log(' Admin User: admin@tcgvault.com')` line.** This brief deletes it along with the password line (R3), but the admin email itself is still hardcoded in the SQL `INSERT` (line 135) and is going to be renamed under the queued `pick-a-name` convoy (P1 #12). Not a credentials issue, but worth noting that the email is still a known constant. **Why not fixed here:** branding decision belongs to `pick-a-name`; this convoy is credentials-only. diff --git a/.convoys/drop-public-setup/brief-1-env-var-admin-password.md b/.convoys/drop-public-setup/brief-1-env-var-admin-password.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e80764 --- /dev/null +++ b/.convoys/drop-public-setup/brief-1-env-var-admin-password.md @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +--- +convoy: drop-public-setup +brief_number: 1 +depends_on: [] +files: + - scripts/setup-neon-db.js + - README.md +--- + +# Brief 1: Require `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD`; strip credentials from README + +## Goal (1 sentence) + +Gate admin-user creation in `scripts/setup-neon-db.js` behind a required `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` env var (fail-loud with an actionable message and exit code 1 if unset), remove the hardcoded `'admin123'` literal and the `console.log` lines that echo credentials to stdout, and replace the README's "Default Admin Account" section with a "First-time admin setup" paragraph that documents the new env var. + +## Files in scope (do not edit anything else) + +- `scripts/setup-neon-db.js` — modified +- `README.md` — modified + +## Conventions to follow + +- **No-go-zones reading.** `.cursor/rules/no-go-zones.mdc` prohibits editing `scripts/setup-neon-db.js` for **schema** changes (DDL, columns, idempotency-of-DDL). This brief's change is **operational** — env-var gate plus two `console.log` removals, with zero changes to `CREATE TABLE` blocks, table shape, or the `ON CONFLICT` clause. The Architect explicitly recorded this distinction in `.convoys/drop-public-setup.md` § Decisions B. **Do not** treat the no-go-zones rule as banning operational hardening of this file. +- **Match existing file style.** `scripts/setup-neon-db.js` uses `#!/usr/bin/env node` shebang and CommonJS `require('dotenv')` / `require('@neondatabase/serverless')` / `require('bcryptjs')`. The repo's `package.json` is `"type": "module"`, but converting CJS → ESM is **out of scope** for this brief (flagged for a separate follow-up convoy in `.convoys/drop-public-setup.md` § Anything flagged but not acted on). Keep `require()` everywhere; do not introduce `import` statements. +- **Fail-loud-message shape, modeled on Brief 1 of `fix-auth-bypass`.** That brief's `lib/auth-secret.js::JWT_SECRET` throw is the template for the actionable-message shape (names the env var, points at `.env.local`, suggests a generation tip, mentions CI as an alternative). See `.convoys/fix-auth-bypass/brief-1-central-jwt-secret-helper.md` § "Acceptance criteria → `lib/auth-secret.js` (new)" for the verbatim message form. **Difference:** that brief throws at module load; this brief calls `console.error(...)` + `process.exit(1)` at function entry, because the script is a CLI tool, not an imported module — exiting with a non-zero code is the canonical CLI "fail loudly" signal. +- **No new dependencies.** `bcryptjs` and `dotenv` are already in `dependencies`. No `package.json` change. +- **No edits to** any file outside `files:` above. In particular: no `lib/`, no `pages/`, no `components/`, no `scripts/reset-db.js`, no `scripts/create-test-users.js`, no `TESTING_GUIDE.md`. Those three sibling files still reference `admin@tcgvault.com` / `admin123` but are explicitly out of scope per the convoy spec and the architect's flagged follow-ups. If you find yourself wanting to touch them, **stop and flag in PR description**; do not expand the diff. + +## Acceptance criteria + +### `scripts/setup-neon-db.js` + +- [ ] **Add the env-var check at the top of `setupNeonDatabase()`**, **before** the `const sql = neon(process.env.POSTGRES_URL);` line. The check must: + - Read `process.env.ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` into a local `const adminPassword`. + - If `adminPassword` is `undefined`, `null`, empty string, or only whitespace, write a clear error message to `console.error` and call `process.exit(1)`. **Do not** call `process.exit(1)` directly without first logging. + - The error message body MUST name the env var, point at `.env.local`, give a generation suggestion, and mention the CI-secret alternative. Verbatim shape (the message body MAY be reworded for tone, but every claim MUST be present): + +```js +const adminPassword = process.env.ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD; +if (!adminPassword || !adminPassword.trim()) { + console.error( + '❌ ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD environment variable is not set.\n' + + '\n' + + ' Set it in .env.local for local dev, or as a CI secret if you run setup from CI.\n' + + ' Generate a strong password with: openssl rand -base64 24\n' + + ' See README.md → "First-time admin setup" for the full flow.\n' + ); + process.exit(1); +} +``` + +- [ ] **The check sits BEFORE the `neon(...)` call** so the script does not open a DB connection (and does not run any DDL) when the env var is missing. This is the documented contract — operators see the error and fix their env BEFORE touching the database. +- [ ] **Replace `bcrypt.hash('admin123', 12)`** (currently line 131) with `bcrypt.hash(adminPassword, 12)`. The `12` cost factor is unchanged. +- [ ] **Do not change `ON CONFLICT (email) DO NOTHING`** on the `INSERT INTO users` statement (line 136). This is intentional — re-running `setup-db` on an env that already has the admin row is a no-op for the password. Rotation is out of scope (Decision A — see convoy file). +- [ ] **Delete the two credential-echo `console.log` lines** in the success summary (currently lines 144-145): + +```js +// before: +console.log(' Admin User: admin@tcgvault.com'); +console.log(' Admin Password: admin123'); + +// after: replace BOTH lines with a single line that does not echo credentials: +console.log(' Admin user ready (email: admin@tcgvault.com)'); +``` + + Do **not** interpolate `adminPassword` into the log — that would put the chosen password into stdout (and into CI logs if setup ever runs there). The chosen password lives in the operator's env-var source only. +- [ ] The script's existing CommonJS `require()` calls, transaction structure (none — each `sql\`\`` is its own connection per Neon HTTP semantics), and error handling (`try/catch` with `process.exit(1)` on failure) are **unchanged**. +- [ ] No new `require()` imports. `bcryptjs` is already required inline at line 130 (move it to the top of the file ONLY if the linter complains; otherwise leave inline to keep the diff minimal). + +### `README.md` + +- [ ] **Update the env-example block in step 3** (currently lines 44-52) of the Installation section. Add `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` after `JWT_SECRET` with a comment. Final shape of that block: + +```env +POSTGRES_URL="postgresql://your-username:your-password@your-host/your-database" +JWT_SECRET="" +# Required for `npm run setup-db` — used once to hash the initial admin password. +# Set in .env.local for local dev, or as a CI secret if you run setup from CI. +ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD="" +# Optional — exercise the rate limiter locally. Without them, `lib/rate-limit.js` +# warn-and-no-ops in dev. In production these are auto-provisioned by the +# Vercel Upstash Marketplace integration. +KV_REST_API_URL="https://.upstash.io" +KV_REST_API_TOKEN="" +``` + + Keep the existing trailing line `` `JWT_SECRET` is **required** — `lib/auth-secret.js` throws at import time if it's unset. ``. Add a second sentence immediately after it: `` `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` is **required** for `npm run setup-db` — the script exits with code 1 if it's unset. `` +- [ ] **Replace the "🔐 Default Admin Account" section** (currently lines 115-119) with a "🔐 First-time admin setup" section. New copy (markdown body is suggestive, not verbatim — adjust prose to match repo voice, but every claim below MUST be present): + +```markdown +## 🔐 First-time admin setup + +`npm run setup-db` creates a single admin user the first time it runs. The +password is read from the `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` environment variable; the +script exits with code 1 (and does not open a database connection) if the +variable is unset or empty. + +- **Local dev:** set `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` in `.env.local` before running + `npm run setup-db`. Use `openssl rand -base64 24` (or any other strong + source) to generate the value. +- **CI / Vercel:** set `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` as a project secret if setup + ever runs from CI. The env var is **only** read by the seed script; runtime + auth uses the per-user password stored in the database. +- **Admin email:** the seed creates `admin@tcgvault.com`. Change the password + immediately after first login via the app's profile settings. + +> **Operators of envs that pre-date this change:** `npm run setup-db` is +> idempotent (`ON CONFLICT (email) DO NOTHING`) — re-running it with +> `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` set will **not** rotate an existing admin row's +> password. If your environment was set up before this change and still has +> the weak default (`admin123`), rotate the password manually via the app +> after logging in, or wait for the queued `rotate-default-admin` follow-up +> convoy. +``` + +- [ ] **Remove every other occurrence of `admin123` in `README.md`.** Grep verification: `rg 'admin123' README.md` returns **zero** hits after this brief. +- [ ] **Do NOT remove the line `**Admin Panel**: Manage cards and users`** under "## 🚀 Features" — that's a feature description, not a credential. +- [ ] **Do NOT touch the "Database Schema" / "API Endpoints" / "Deployment" sections.** Out of scope. + +### Repo-wide grep verification (run before opening PR) + +- [ ] `rg "'admin123'" --type js scripts/setup-neon-db.js` returns **zero** hits. +- [ ] `rg 'admin123' README.md` returns **zero** hits. +- [ ] `rg 'process\.env\.ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD' --type js` returns exactly one hit — in `scripts/setup-neon-db.js`. +- [ ] `rg 'admin123' --type js scripts/` returns hits in `scripts/reset-db.js` and `scripts/create-test-users.js`. **Leave those alone** — they are explicitly out of scope per the convoy spec (see § "Out of scope" in `.convoys/drop-public-setup.md` and § "Anything flagged but not acted on" in the architecture section). Document them in the PR description as known-but-deferred references. +- [ ] `rg 'admin123' TESTING_GUIDE.md` still has one hit (line 7). Leave it; same follow-up bucket. + +### Smoke (manual — no test runner for this brief; Decision C — C1) + +Run these in order and paste the relevant terminal output into the PR description: + +- [ ] **Fail-loud path.** In your shell, `unset ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` (or comment it out in `.env.local`), then run `npm run setup-db`. Expect: + - Exit code is 1 (`echo $?` immediately after returns `1`). + - Stderr contains the error message body (env var name, `.env.local` reference, `openssl rand -base64 24` suggestion, README pointer). + - **Stdout does NOT contain `✅ Connecting to Neon database...`** — the check fires before the `neon(...)` call. +- [ ] **Happy path.** Set `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD=temporary-strong-pw-for-smoke` in `.env.local` (or `export` it in the shell), then run `npm run setup-db`. Expect: + - Exit code is 0. + - Stdout includes `✅ Created admin user` (or the existing equivalent line if the row already exists — both are acceptable; `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING` keeps the script idempotent). + - Stdout does **NOT** contain the literal string `admin123` anywhere. + - Stdout does **NOT** contain `temporary-strong-pw-for-smoke` (the chosen password) anywhere. +- [ ] **End-to-end login.** With the env var still set, run `npm run dev`. From a second terminal: `curl -sX POST http://localhost:3000/api/auth/login -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"email":"admin@tcgvault.com","password":"temporary-strong-pw-for-smoke"}'`. Expect HTTP 200 + a JWT in the body **only if** the admin row was created by this run (i.e. the DB was empty for `admin@tcgvault.com` before step 2). If the row pre-existed with a different password (e.g. the weak `admin123` from before this convoy), expect 401 — that's the documented R1 / Decision A behavior (re-running setup-db does **not** rotate; that's manual rotation territory). Paste whichever outcome you got and note which case applies. +- [ ] **Lint baseline.** `npm run lint` exits 0 (or matches the existing pre-PR baseline — pre-existing lint errors are fine; do not introduce new ones). +- [ ] **Tests.** `npm run test:run` is green (no new tests added per Decision C; existing 16 auth tests should still pass — this brief does not touch any file they cover). + +### Pre-merge operator checklist (paste into PR description) + +This is the human-side handoff. Reviewer confirms each item is acknowledged before merging: + +- [ ] **R1 callout:** "Existing deploys with the weak `admin123` hash are NOT rotated by this PR. If any deployed environment (production, staging, dev branches) currently has `admin@tcgvault.com / admin123` in its database, the operator must rotate the password manually after this merges — log in with the weak password, change it via profile settings, then verify the new hash. The queued `rotate-default-admin` follow-up convoy will land an idempotent rotation script if any real deploy still has the weak hash after manual triage." +- [ ] **CI / Vercel env var:** "Before merging, confirm `ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD` is set as a Vercel project secret on any branch that runs `npm run setup-db` from CI (today: none — this is a `package.json` script run manually). If/when a setup CI step is added, the secret MUST be in place first or the CI job will exit 1." +- [ ] **Reviewer ran the fail-loud and happy-path smoke locally** OR has confirmed the PR description includes terminal output proving both paths. + +### Out of scope (do not do these) + +- [ ] No edit to `scripts/reset-db.js`, `scripts/create-test-users.js`, `TESTING_GUIDE.md`. Sibling weak-credential references — convoy out-of-scope, architect-flagged follow-up. +- [ ] No edit to `lib/auth-secret.js`. JWT secret model is `fix-auth-bypass` Brief 1's surface, already shipped. +- [ ] No edit to `pages/api/auth/login.js` or `pages/api/auth/register.js`. CORS / rate-limit are `fix-auth-bypass` Brief 4's surface, already shipped (partial — `verify.js` deferred to `cors-tighten`). +- [ ] No CommonJS → ESM conversion of `scripts/setup-neon-db.js`. Flagged for a separate convoy. +- [ ] No idempotent rotation script under `scripts/migrations/`. Decision A defers this to the queued `rotate-default-admin` follow-up convoy. +- [ ] No new `vitest` tests for the env-var path. Decision C — C1. +- [ ] No `package.json` change. `bcryptjs` and `dotenv` are already installed. +- [ ] No `AGENTS.md` or `.cursor/rules/*.mdc` updates. Doc-writer pass updates these AFTER the convoy lands. (Specifically: Gotcha #4 in `AGENTS.md` is the next doc-writer change; do not touch it in this PR.) +- [ ] No `.github/workflows/*.yml` change. CI gates for forbidden endpoints are already in place from `fix-auth-bypass` Brief 3. + +## Rationale (≤3 sentences) + +Gating the seed script behind a required env var converts the one remaining hardcoded credential in the source tree (the `'admin123'` bcrypt input) into operator-supplied input, while the README rewrite removes the same credential from the documentation surface — together they close P0 #3 from `.convoys/ship-readiness.md` and resolve `AGENTS.md` Gotcha #4. Keeping `ON CONFLICT (email) DO NOTHING` and deleting (rather than reformatting) the credential-echo `console.log` lines ensures the brief does not introduce a silent-rotation surprise (R4) or a stdout-leak surprise (R3) on top of the intended fix. Holding the no-go-zones reading at "operational change is allowed" — and documenting it explicitly in this brief — gives the next agent (likely doc-writer or whoever opens `rotate-default-admin`) a clear precedent for distinguishing operational hardening of `setup-neon-db.js` from the prohibited schema-edit case.