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import { Ratelimit } from '@upstash/ratelimit' ;
import { Redis } from '@upstash/redis' ;
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// Per-class limiter configuration. Distinct Redis prefix per class is
// REQUIRED — without it, a search-class hit would consume the auth-class
// budget for the same identifier. `slidingWindow` chosen across all
// classes to match Brief 4's existing algorithm; switching to
// `tokenBucket` per-class would be its own convoy.
const LIMITER _CONFIG = {
feat(brand): unify on Deck Hearth across in-repo strings + infra (P1 brand decision)
Resolves the launch-blocking 'TCG Vault vs Deck Hearth' inconsistency called out in AGENTS.md line 5 since project setup. Operator gate-0 decision: Deck Hearth wins. Two briefs applied serially. B1 (mechanical): 7-file display + comment sweep. B2 (infrastructure): Redis prefix rename in lib/rate-limit.js (5 prefixes, accept one-time counter reset), package.json + lockfile regen (STOP-on-churn confirmed only name lines changed), admin/alice/bob email rename in seed scripts + login pre-fill + NEW idempotent migration script scripts/migrations/2026-05-24-rename-admin-email.js. Risk 4 PRESERVE applied: test/lib/permission-middleware.test.js retains admin@tcgvault.com literal with 7-line architect-authored why comment (documents pre-fix-auth-bypass bug shape; preserves historical truth per project's gotcha-documentation convention). All 5 D-decisions ratified at gate-1 (Deck Hearth / deck-hearth / deckhearth / admin@deckhearth.com / full deckhearth Redis prefix). Local: lint 128 baseline (B1 + B2), vitest 21/21 (B1 + B2). CI all green: Playwright smoke 3/3 against rebranded preview in 1m4s, forbidden-cors-headers pass, forbidden-endpoints pass, Screenshot diff pass, Vercel deployment complete. Cross-validation lineage: 4th convoy where the same 3-test smoke spec defends auth surface through sweeping change (after PR #15 Layout default-user, PR #19 CORS, PR #20 rate-limit, now this PR #21 brand rename). OPERATOR POST-MERGE ACTION REQUIRED: run 'node scripts/migrations/2026-05-24-rename-admin-email.js' against prod Neon DB before next admin login (ordering: migration FIRST, then any subsequent setup-db invocation). Migration is ESM, idempotent, UNIQUE-collision-safe. PR #21 architect-commit 50ce9ab, B1 ac8c998, B2 1c18d21.
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auth : { limit : 5 , window : '15 m' , prefix : 'deckhearth:auth' } ,
search : { limit : 60 , window : '1 m' , prefix : 'deckhearth:search' } ,
upload : { limit : 10 , window : '1 h' , prefix : 'deckhearth:upload' } ,
generate : { limit : 5 , window : '1 h' , prefix : 'deckhearth:generate' } ,
import : { limit : 5 , window : '1 h' , prefix : 'deckhearth:import' } ,
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scan : { limit : 5 , window : '1 m' , prefix : 'deckhearth:scan' } ,
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} ;
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// Lazy singleton. Module-load init would throw in environments without
// Upstash env vars (local dev pre-onboarding, tests that transitively
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// import the auth handlers, Vercel build-time bundling). Defer
// construction until the first request actually arrives.
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let cached = null ;
function init ( ) {
// Env-var names match Vercel's Upstash Marketplace integration, which
// auto-provisions KV_REST_API_URL and KV_REST_API_TOKEN. See
// https://upstash.com/docs/redis/howto/vercelintegration. Single-source-
// of-truth — do NOT alias to UPSTASH_REDIS_REST_*.
const url = process . env . KV _REST _API _URL ;
const token = process . env . KV _REST _API _TOKEN ;
if ( url && token ) {
const redis = new Redis ( { url , token } ) ;
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const instances = new Map ( ) ;
for ( const [ name , cfg ] of Object . entries ( LIMITER _CONFIG ) ) {
instances . set (
name ,
new Ratelimit ( {
redis ,
limiter : Ratelimit . slidingWindow ( cfg . limit , cfg . window ) ,
prefix : cfg . prefix ,
} )
) ;
}
return { mode : 'live' , instances } ;
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}
if ( process . env . NODE _ENV === 'production' ) {
// Fail-closed in production. A single failed login is a better outcome
// than silently disabling brute-force protection on the live site.
throw new Error (
'[rate-limit] Upstash not configured. Set KV_REST_API_URL and KV_REST_API_TOKEN in the deployment environment (auto-provisioned by the Vercel Upstash Marketplace integration) before serving auth traffic.'
) ;
}
console . warn (
'[rate-limit] KV_REST_API_URL / KV_REST_API_TOKEN not set — rate limiting disabled (dev/test only)'
) ;
return { mode : 'noop' } ;
}
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function extractIpIdentifier ( req ) {
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const xff = req . headers ? . [ 'x-forwarded-for' ] ;
const firstHop = Array . isArray ( xff ) ? xff [ 0 ] : xff ? . split ( ',' ) [ 0 ] ? . trim ( ) ;
return firstHop || req . socket ? . remoteAddress || 'anonymous' ;
}
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// THROWS on missing userId. Per-user limiters MUST sit AFTER the auth
// check in the handler body — silently falling back to IP here would
// convert a per-user limit into a per-IP limit, locking out other
// household members for one user's behavior. The throw surfaces the
// misordering immediately during development rather than at first
// production incident.
function extractUserIdentifier ( userId ) {
if (
userId === null ||
userId === undefined ||
userId === '' ||
( typeof userId === 'number' && Number . isNaN ( userId ) )
) {
throw new Error (
'[rate-limit] extractUserIdentifier called without an authenticated userId. Place the rate-limit gate AFTER the auth check, never before.'
) ;
}
return ` user: ${ userId } ` ;
}
async function check ( className , identifier ) {
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if ( ! cached ) {
cached = init ( ) ;
}
if ( cached . mode === 'noop' ) {
return { allowed : true , remaining : Infinity , reset : 0 } ;
}
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const limiter = cached . instances . get ( className ) ;
if ( ! limiter ) {
throw new Error ( ` [rate-limit] Unknown limiter class: ${ className } ` ) ;
}
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try {
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const { success , remaining , reset } = await limiter . limit ( identifier ) ;
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return { allowed : success , remaining , reset } ;
} catch ( err ) {
// Fail-open on Upstash outage. A hard outage at the rate-limit backend
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// should not lock the entire user base out. Brute-force protection
// lives behind defense-in-depth (Vercel firewall, etc.).
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console . error ( '[rate-limit]' , err ) ;
return { allowed : true , remaining : Infinity , reset : 0 } ;
}
}
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export async function checkAuthRateLimit ( req ) {
return check ( 'auth' , extractIpIdentifier ( req ) ) ;
}
export async function checkSearchRateLimit ( req ) {
return check ( 'search' , extractIpIdentifier ( req ) ) ;
}
export async function checkUploadRateLimit ( req , userId ) {
return check ( 'upload' , extractUserIdentifier ( userId ) ) ;
}
export async function checkGenerateRateLimit ( req , userId ) {
return check ( 'generate' , extractUserIdentifier ( userId ) ) ;
}
export async function checkImportRateLimit ( req , userId ) {
return check ( 'import' , extractUserIdentifier ( userId ) ) ;
}
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export async function checkScanRateLimit ( req , userId ) {
return check ( 'scan' , extractUserIdentifier ( userId ) ) ;
}